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I. INTRODUCTION
The arrival of the 104th Congress' new Republican majority intensi-
fied long-standing public debate over appropriate ownership and manage-
ment of federal public lands. The underlying issues are, as ever, what role
local, state and federal governments should play in public lands resource
allocation, management and, more basically, which groups and interests
will dominate decision making. The familiar posturing of Sagebrush Re-
bels, Wise Users, state and local rights advocates, commodity interests
great and small, and both grass roots and national environmental groups
have been recast ever so slightly under the rubric of "forest health."' In
addition, the emergence of community consensus groups such as the
Quincy Library and Applegate Watershed Groups2 have put unusual em-
phasis on understanding state and local alternatives to federal land man-
agement systems.3 An increasingly important part of any position for or
against the status quo is to evaluate institutional options.
In this article, we continue our efforts to explore the state trust land
model as a major land management system in the western United States.
While not all state lands fall under the trust mandate, about 135 million
acres do.4 Their treatment provides significant insight into management of
all public resources.5 We will compare a crucial subset of the larger deci-
sion-making apparatus operative on federal and state trust lands: the crite-
1. Most succinctly, forest ecosystem health can be defmed as "the vigor or vitality of interact-
ing biotic and abiotic elements of a system characterized by extensive tree cover that function together
to sustain life and are isolated mentally for human purposes." Jay O'Laughlin et al., Defining and
Measuring Forest Health, 2 J. SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY 65, 67 (1994); see also David Rapport, What
Constitutes Ecosystem Health? 33 PERSPECnVES IN BIOLOGY & MEDICINE 120 (1989); David Rapport
et al., Ecosystem Health: An Emerging Integrative Science, in EVALUATING AND MONITORING THE
HEALTH OF ECOSYSTEMS (1995). For an interesting narrative on forest health, see Langston, FOREST
DREAMS, FOREST NIGHTMARES: THE PARADOX OF OLD GROWTH IN THE INLAND WEST (1995). A
major aspect of the forest health issue is the growing realization that 100 years of fire suppression has
led to an enormous build-up of fuel, and hence a growing risk of fire, throughout the western United
States. This has led some environmentalists to fear that the timber industry will use fire risk as a
wedge to open areas to harvest-either as a prophylactic measure or as salvage-where it would other-
wise be inappropriate or illegal.
2. See generally Jack Shipley, Watershed Based Efforts: The Applegate Partnership of South-
west Oregon, a paper presented at a conference entitled "Challenging Federal Ownership and Manage-
ment: Public Lands and Public Benefits," Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado
School of Law, Boulder (Oct. 11-13, 1995) and Michael Jackson, Sharing Public Land Decision Mak-
ing: Public-Private Partnerships 11, a paper presented at the same conference.
3. Sally K. Fairfax, Thinking the Unthinkable: States as Public Land Managers, 3 HASTINGS
W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 249, 251 (1996).
4. For a discussion of the trust mandate, see Jon A. Souder & Sally K. Fairfax, THE STATE
TRUST LANDS: HISTORY, MANAGEMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE USE (1996), especially Chapter One [here-
inafter STATE TRUST LANDS]. See also Jon A. Souder et al., Sustainable Resources Management and
State School Lands: The Quest for Guiding Principles, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 271 (1994).
5. See generally STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 4.
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ria courts employ in reviewing land management decisions. Specifically,
we will juxtapose review of federal multiple-use land manager's decisions
under provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)6 with
equivalent criteria used to assess beneficiary challenges of trustee deci-
sions on state trust lands. We will make these comparisons in the context
of timber salvage sales on national forest land in Idaho and state trust land
in Washington.
Two recent timber salvage cases provide an excellent point of depar-
ture for our inquiry into state and federal review criteria.7 The salvage
issue is an increasingly important focus of debate in forest policy in gener-
al. Recent challenges to federal salvage sales provide an exceptional op-
portunity to observe relatively unalloyed APA standards in action. This is
because a major element of recent federal salvage sale policy has been the
suspension of numerous substantive legal requirements and criteria.8
Modem administrative law delegates significant authority to adminis-
trative agencies and affords great deference to agency interpretation and
exercise of that authority.9 Judicial review focuses on three general ques-
tions: 1) is the action authorized by statute; 2) were proper procedures
followed; and 3) is the action reasonable, as opposed to "arbitrary and
capricious?"' Judicial interpretation of the third criterion has varied con-
siderably over time. During the 1960s and increasingly after the passage
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)," courts were inclined
to take a "hard look" at agency actions, requiring administrators to:
1) consult widely with relevant public interest groups to assure that all
relevant views were considered; and 2) assemble a comprehensive record
of substantial evidence to demonstrate the reasonableness of their deci-
sions." At other times, courts have confined their review to what one
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
7. The federal case is Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 917 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Idaho
1995), affd, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996). The state case is Okanogan County v. Belcher, No. 95-2-
00867-9 (Chelan County Sup. CL May 30, 1996).
8. See infra, notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
9. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)
("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to ad-
ministrative interpretations.").
10. See, e.g., id. at 844 (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Schweiker
v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977); AT&T v.
United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1936)).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994). For a discussion of the relationship between NEPA and
the APA, see Sally K. Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement, 199 Sci. 743 (Feb. 17,
1978).
12. A standard reference point for the emergence of the hard look doctrine is Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F. 2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965). For a discussion of
the importance of public participation in agency decision making, see generally, Richard B. Stewart,
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author has characterized as "idiot" or "lunacy" standards. 3
In either of these judicial modes, agency decisions have generally
enjoyed great latitude from the courts. This deference is based on two
general assumptions: first, that the agency has sufficient expertise to make
reasonable interpretations of and decisions under its mandate, while the
court lacks appropriate expertise to conduct a de novo review; and second,
that the separation of powers doctrine keeps the court at bay, requiring
that it confine its review to interpretations of the law.14 What tends to
occur in recent practice is that the administrative agency concentrates on
preparing a defensible record to justify its discretionary acts-which has
the effect of forcing the agency to evince a level of certainty in its actions
that may be unfounded."5
Trust land managers are reviewed under two sets of judicial criteria.
This is because the trust land managers act as administrators, primarily
when they deal with lessees of trust resources. In this capacity they are
essentially no different from their federal counterparts. But they also act as
trustees. As this article will demonstrate, the two review standards are
quite different. Our analysis of trust land cases has revealed an important
pattern in judicial review of trustee discretion: when the trustee is chal-
lenged by a lessee, the trustee is treated as an administrator and all the
standards of review outlined above, as translated into the administrative
procedure act of each state, are operative. However, when the trustee is
challenged by the beneficiary, the criteria are different; the courts apply
trust law and the standard of the "prudent trustee" to evaluate the trustee's
action.'6 It is this latter set of cases that are of interest here.
Centuries of law defining appropriate trustee action turns on the re-
quirement that a trustee act prudently, with undivided loyalty to the desig-
nated beneficiary of the trust. The trustee's first duty is to act prudently,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (June 1975).
13. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS (1988). Shapiro characterizes the
standards of review as, "when a court in effect says, 'if you are going to try something as idiotic as
this, you'll have to make a much better rule-maidng record' and "a reviewing court was to intervene
only if the agency had committed lunacy." See id. at 179 n.14 & 110.
14. On the general model and recent variants, see generally, Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Dele-
gation of Legislative Power: 1, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1947); Maria E. Mansfield, The "New" Old
Law of Judicial Access: Toward a Mirror-Image Nondelegation Theory, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 89-94
(1993); Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under Environmental Laws, 24 Hous.
L. REv. 97 (1987); Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Adminis-
trative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970); Cass R.
Sunstein, lfeyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Re-
vival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 567 (1992); Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Action, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1991).
15. See SHAPIRo, supra note 13, at 151.
16. See STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 4, at 30-36, 276-78.
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that is, to "display the skill and prudence which an ordinarily capable and
careful man would use in the conduct of his own business ... ,,17 This
concept is usually embellished with terms such as "carefulness, precaution,
attentiveness, and good judgment, as 'applied to action or conduct."'" Re-
cent definitions of prudence have focused on the trustee's responsibility to
weigh the relative risks of various courses of action, which can then be
explicitly incorporated into the trustee's decisions. 9 If the trustee claims
that she is possessed of "unusual capacities," she will be "required to
display" them, and if a trustee "actually has greater than normal abilities,
[s]he will be expected to use them in the performance of the trust." The
duty of loyalty, or undivided loyalty as it is frequently stated, requires the
trustee to administer the trust "solely in the interests of the beneficiaries,
and to exclude from consideration his own advantages and the welfare of
third persons .... In enforcing the duty of loyalty, the court is primarily
interested in... deterring trustees from getting into positions of conflict
of interests, and only secondarily in preventing loss to particular beneficia-
ries or unjust enrichment of the trustee."'
There are a number of important differences between judicial review
using APA standards and judicial review of a trustees' prudence. The first
and most obvious differences have to do with issues of access to judicial
review. Aggrieved beneficiaries do not have to demonstrate that their
complaints are timely, that they have exhiausted their administrative reme-
dies, or make the preliminary showings that frequently bar those who
would challenge federal administrative decisions. In general, for several
reasons, the courts are more receptive to beneficiary challenges of trustee
prudence than they are to average citizens' complaints about administra-
tors. We will discuss two of those reasons. First, the issue of what law to
apply does not arise in trust land disputes as frequently as it does in dis-
putes concerning federal public lands. Courts do not find themselves un-
able to review actions that have been "committed by law"' to trustee dis-
cretion. Similarly, standing is far less important in challenging a trustee
than challenging an administrator. Except in a few jurisdictions such as
Idaho and Minnesota,u a taxpayer in the state may obtain standing to
17. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRusTs § 93, at 334 (6th ed. 1987).
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1226 (6th ed. 1990).
19. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992) (Prudent Investor Rule).
20. BOGERT, supra note 17, at 334.
21. Id. at 341.
22. This language comes from Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830 (citing the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2). See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Idaho Watershed Project, Inc. v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, No. CV 94-1171,
(5th Jud. Dist. 1994), discussed in Sally K. Fairfax, Grazing Leasing on State Trust Lands: Four Cur-
rent Conflicts, a paper prepared for the Political Economy Research Center's Forum on Environmental-
ism in the West, Lone Mountain Ranch, Big Sky, Montana (June 13-16, 1996) (on file with authors).
24. See Sally K. Fairfax et al., The School Trust Lands. A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom,
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challenge the trustee on fiduciary issues. In prior decades the access issue
has arguably been a distinction without a difference-it has not mattered
much because federal courts were quite open to plaintiffs wanting to bring
diverse challenges. However, if the federal courts continue to raise the bar
on standing to citizen suits,' these apparently minor matters may take on
added significance.
The second major distinction has already been suggested. The APA
standard of "arbitrary and capricious" requires the administrator to amass a
record to support her decision; typically in the national forest context, that
involves defending the choice of one option against others which the For-
est Service has proposed and analyzed. This frequently leads to decision
makers averring a certainty which they do not truly experience and which
is not justifiable on the record. This APA standard differs importantly
from the trustee's obligation to exercise prudence-that is, to weigh the
risks and benefits of a proposed action and to exercise judgment. The
former requires an accumulation of data and creation of a record of deci-
sion that appears to invite challenge-this fact or that was overlooked,
improperly weighed, or misinterpreted. The latter allows for ambiguities
and imperfections but also permits decision makers to explicitly make hard
choices.
The third and major distinction between the standards of judicial
review is a difference in the courts' response to an assertion of expertise.
Roughly stated, administrative expertise invites and requires judicial defer-
ence and a recognition by the court of its own limited expertise. This
deference is, as noted above, in part a reflection of the separation of pow-
ers, and is, as many commentators have noted, likely to intensify under
the leadership of the Scalia Court.' In contrast, when a trustee asserts a
high level of expertise, reviewing courts do not defer, but respond instead
by requiring a higher level of performance.' The importance of this dis-
tinction lies in the location of the burden of proof. In administrative law,
22 ENiVr. L. 797, 850 n.194 (1992) (discussing Segner v. State Inv. Bd., No. 587-489319 (Ramsey
County Dist. CL, Minn., Aug 11, 1988)).
25. For an interesting discussion of standing issues see Gene R. Nichol Jr., Rethinking
Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68 (1984); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Ele-
ment of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and
the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432 (1988); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988); see also Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), discussed
in Karin Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental Standing to Constrain the
Courts, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 10557 (December 1990) and John Treangen, Standing: Closing the Doors of
Judicial Review-Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 36 S.D. L. REV. 136 (1991).
26. Scalia is clearly on the record. He wrote both Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
871 (1990), and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also Scalia, supra note 25.
27. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (Prudent Investor Rule).
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there is a presumption that the agency has made a decision based on its
experience and the challenger must demonstrate otherwise. In trust law,
the trustee is required to demonstrate that she is acting prudently.
Our task in this article is to demonstrate that these distinctions are
meaningful in the judicial review of trustee and administrator decisions.
We shall do so in the context of the salvage sales issue: both federal and
state trust land managers are confronting issues surrounding the salvage of
dead and dying timber. The issue is an ancient one, given renewed urgen-
cy and public visibility by the recent spate of sensational wildfires, and
the resulting public concern about wildfires and accumulation of fire-dam-
aged timber.
The concerns expressed by both state and federal agencies are simi-
lar. what is the extent of the damage; what is the value of the damaged
trees, and how does this value deteriorate over time; what costs are in-
volved in harvesting, and are they offset by the benefits; what other re-
source values are affected by potential actions (or inaction); and what is
the relationship between current action and future forest condition? At the
federal level, the issue has become the focus of major public debate as a
result of legislation passed in 1995, in which Congress sought to compel
the Forest Service to increase the pace of salvage logging operations.s
We will compare litigation under that statute to a controversy surrounding
salvage harvests on a trust-land forest in the State of Washington.
Washington's Loomis Forest litigation, which we have selected as the
focus of this analysis, is an uncommonly complex context in which the
trustee has been required to demonstrate undivided loyalty. The case is
particularly useful in demonstrating the differences between APA and
trustee standards of review.
During the summer of 1994, almost 1.5 million acres of National
Forest System land were burned by over 14,000 wildfires; 28 firefighters
lost their lives suppressing the fires. Congress, concerned that the federal
management agencies were insufficiently energetic in harvesting fire-killed
trees, passed the "Salvage Rider" to the 1995 Rescissions ActO This Act
gave the managing agencies significant discretion in how they complied
with environmental laws, particularly the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)'s and NEPA,2 as well as their own organic legislation (most
28. See Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program, Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 240
(1995) (found at "Statutory Note" to 16 U.S.C.A. § 1611 (1996)) [hereinafter Rescissions Act or Sal-
vage Rider]. The Rescissions Act is discussed in detail infra at notes 120-132 and accompanying text.
27. See Rescissions Act, § 2001(b)(1).
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
29. 42 U.SC. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
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prominently the National Forest Management Act3 for the Forest Ser-
vice, and the Federal Lands Policy and Management Acte' for the BLM).
The Act also required the agencies to maximize efforts to harvest salvage-
able timber for the two years of the program created by the Recessions
Act.32 We will examine the results of this legislation on Forest Service
decision making, using salvage timber sales litigated under the Rescissions
Act.
Over the two-year period covered by the Rescissions Act, 11,435
salvage timber sales were held by the Forest Service, with a total volume
of 4.6 billion board feet.3 These sales resulted in sixteen legal
challenges.34 We will examine one such challenge, Idaho Conservation
League v. Thomas," as an example of the outer bounds of actions that
are considered valid under federal administrative law. Although this case
is the most extreme, the contours of the arguments over administrative
procedure are also found in other Rescissions Act cases.'
We will use a contrasting case concerning state trust lands to illus-
trate how the two review criteria differ. The Loomis State Forest in Wash-
ington suffered an infestation of mountain bark beetle in 1987, which
intensified and became serious in 1992."7 The Washington Department of
Natural Resources (DNR), the managing agency for the trustee, established
a two-track strategy of limited salvage while awaiting preparation of a
landscape-level plan for the forest.38 Believing that significant economic
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
31. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
32. Rescissions Act, § 2001(b)(1) ("During the emergency period, the Secretary concerned is to
achieve, to the maximum extent feasible, a salvage timber sale volume level above the programmed
level to reduce the backlogged volume of salvage timber.").
33. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMERGENCY SALVAGE SALE PRoGRAM-FOREST SER-
VICE MEt iTs TARGET, BUT MORE TIMBER COULD HAVE BEEN OFFERED FOR SALE 4, 11 ( Feb. 24,
1997).
34. Id. at 10.
35. 917 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Idaho 1995), affd, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996).
36. For example, in Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 906 F. Supp.
410, 412 (E.D. Ky. 1995), and Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman, 911 F. Supp. 431,
434 (D. Mont. 1995), the trial courts based their decisions on the arbitrary and capricious standard
under the APA. However, the Ninth Circuit, in Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman, 88
F.3d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), and Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 798
(9th Cir. 1996), framed the issue as whether there is, in fact, any other "law to apply" in reaching a
decision under the Rescissions Act. Because the Ninth Circuit based its decision in Idaho Conserva-
tion League on that issue, see 91 F.3d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1996), the case provides a suitable exam-
ple.
37. Okanogan County v. Belcher, No. 95-2-00867-9, at 5 (Chelan County Sup. Ct. May 30,
1996).
38. The general evolution of forest planning is discussed in Jon A. Souder et al., Is State Trust
Land Timber Management Better Than Federal Timber Management?:The Best Case Analysis, (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the authors). The specific detail of Loomis Forest planning is discussed
in State Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Request for Mandamus Writ/Equitable or Injunctive Re-
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values were at risk, some trust beneficiaries (one county and thirteen indi-
vidual school districts) sued. In this suit, Okanogan County v. Belcher,
plaintiffs alleged that the state imprudently held back economic benefits
out of consideration for other resources that were not of direct benefit to
them. In so doing, they alleged, the DNR risked catastrophic fire on the
Loomis. 9 The DNR responded that: 1) they were considering not only
present benefits, but also how management actions would affect future
beneficiaries; and 2) they were required to comply with federal laws and
state laws of general applicability, such as the Washington State Environ-
mental Policy Act. °
A comparison of these two cases demonstrates that the distinction
between "arbitrary and capricious" and "prudent" has real effects, both in
agency decision-making processes and in judicial review. Our discussion
will progress in three sections. In Section II, we will contrast the APA
notion of "arbitrary and capricious" with trust principles summarized in
the notion of "prudence." We will focus less on continuing Supreme Court
reinterpretations of administrative law4' than on how district courts have
dealt with these issues. Our discussion of prudence will follow recent
developments in the Prudent Investor Rule in standard trust law.42 In Sec-
tion I, we will discuss agency decisions in salvage timber sales, prior to
and after Congress passed, in 1995, of the Salvage Timber Rider.
In Section IV, we will apply these concepts to evaluate two different
management contexts. We will use two case studies to illustrate the differ-
ences in the review standards applied to federal land managers and those
applied to state trust land trustees. In Section V, we will conclude by
pointing to two consequences for land management which seem closely
related to proceeding under one or another of these two types of review
criteria. The primary ramification is that trust law appears to provide a
clearer, more stable foundation for the exercise and review of managers'
discretion. We will also argue that trust law provides greater assurance of
sustainable resource production because of its explicit consideration of
future beneficiaries.
lief at 5-14, Okanogan County v. Belcher (No. 95-2-00867-9).
39. See Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Request for Mandatory and Injunctive Relief at
4-6, Okanogan County.
40. See State Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Request for Mandamus Writ/Equitable or In-
junctive Relief at 17, 22-26, Okanogan County. Washington's Environmental Policy Act is codified at
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.010 - 43.21C.910 (1996).
41. The issue of standing has occasioned an enormous flowering of the literature. See supra
notes 14 & 25; see also Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L J.
1487 (1983).
42. The primary background for this discussion will be the evolution from the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 230 (1959) to the RESTATEMENT CTHmD) OF TRusTs §§ 227-229 (1992) (Pru-
dent Investor Rule).
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II. REVIEW CRITERIA IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND TRUST LAW
In the political science and public administration professions, a vener-
able body of literature compares the virtues of a rule-based, as opposed to
an education- and discretion-based, system of bureaucratic control." This
distinction is visible in a gross comparison of federal and state trust land
management: state trust land managers have a simple, clear goal and enor-
mous discretion in how to reach that goal, while federal land managers are
hemmed in by volumes of procedural rules, yet are directed to achieve
ambiguous, often incompatible goals." Salvage logging, as discussed
herein, provides an excellent window into this rules/discretion debate. We
shall peep through with an emphasis on understanding how judicial treat-
ment of the theoretical dispute plays out on the ground in management of
forest resources.
A. Review of Federal Administrative Decisions
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 (APA) 5 establishes
rules that define the relationship between administrative agencies and
reviewing courts.' Three types of agency actions are governed by the
APA: formal rulemaking and agency adjudication,47  informal
rulemaking," and a catch-all category for other informal actions.49 Our
43. The basic literature is voluminous and is insightfully summarized in J. GRUBER, CONTROL-
LING BUREAUCRACIES: DILEMMAS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (1987), especially Chapter 1. The
basic dispute has been personified as a face-off between Carl J. Friedrich, Public Policy and the Na-
ture of Administrative Responsibility, in FRIEDRICH & MASON, PUB. POLICY (1940) and Herman Finer,
Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government, 1 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 335 (1941).
44. The authors are grateful to Rod Sandoe, now Director of the Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources, for conversations over 15 years that highlight this distinction.
45. Pub. L. No. 104-333, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C. (1994)).
46. Shapiro, supra note 41, at 1490. Others view it less neutrally. See Robert B. Horwitz, Judi-
cial Review of Regulatory Decisions: The Changing Criteria, 109 POL. ScI. Q. 133, 141 (1994) ("if
businesses could not roll back the New Deal, at least they might reduce the power of regulatory agen-
cies by increasing their own procedural rights"); see also Frederick F. Blachly & Miriam E. Oatman,
Sabotage of the Administrative Process, 6 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 213 (1946). A good indication of the
nature of contemporaneous debate is found in KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1-25 (1973);
see also Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 556-557 (1994).
48. § 553.
49. § 558. In formal rulemaking and adjudication, the agency's decision is based solely on the
record established through public hearings and the public comment process. Informal rulemaking is the
process used by most agencies to make decisions of the nature considered here: the agency provides
public notice and an opportunity for comment, then is permitted to use all available data in making a
decision which it is required to publish along with the reasons the agency arrived at its decision. These
agency decisions are generally reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Finally, infor-
mal actions are defined as those that an agency makes on a daily basis, outside of the two categories
described above. Shapiro, supra note 41, at 1488 n.8.
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focus will be on informal rulemaking, since this was the most prevalent
process used in the agency decisions we will analyze. Within that catego-
ry, five threshold questions are important. First, does the party contesting
the agency decision have standing to request court review? Second, did
Congress provide the agency with discretion in how it makes the particular
decision? Third, does the decision under review require the agency to use
its technical expertise? Fourth, does the decision under review establish a
new or different policy, or does it merely continue an existing one? And
finally, is the decision required, or is this, too, discretionary? These five
issues determine first whether a court will review the agency decision, and
then what the court will consider in deciding whether the decision was
arbitrary and capricious.
After exhausting all available administrative remedies, a party con-
testing an agency decision must first gain access to .the courts, i.e., they
must have standing. Standing may be easily obtained in many situations,
depending on the applicable statute or agency regulation." However,
where standing is not liberally provided by law, the contesting party must
show "harm in fact."' Direct harm from the agency action must be dem-
onstrated to gain access to challenge the agency's decision. There is grow-
ing evidence that the courts are, as noted above, raising the bar on stand-
ing, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish injury.52
If the standing hurdle is cleared, courts typically examine the statutes
that govern the agency's specific decision. The basic question is whether
Congress has committed the specific decision or rule in question "to agen-
cy discretion."' Unless Congress has done so, in which case there is "no
law to apply," 4 the decision is reviewable under the provisions of the
relevant statutes and regulations. "No law to apply" was a significant
deterrent to a judicial challenge of an agency's discretion in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 5 When a court finds there is "no
50. For example, in standard decisions involving Forest Service decisions, the agency's regula-
tions at 36 C.F.R. § 211.18 are silent regarding standing. However, § 211.18(e) requires that appellants
state how they were affected by the agency decisions. On salvage decisions, "any individual or organi-
zation wishing to appeal a decision arising from resource removal, recovery, and rehabilitation activi-
ties resulting from natural catastrophe" may do so. § 211.16(c).
51. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife. Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S 555, 560 (1992).
52. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
54. See Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985).
55. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830, citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), which quotes S. Rep. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1945) to the
effect that review of actions "committed to agency discretion" by law is limited to "those rare instanc-
es where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case them is no law to apply.'" See
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law to apply," either Congress explicitly limited the applicability of the
agency's other legislation, or there are no other applicable laws governing
the agency's actions, or a combination of both exist. When this occurs,
courts will find that the agency's actions are solely at the agency's discre-
tion. 6 While Martin Shapiro suggests that there is nearly always some
law to apply-generally in the agency's authorizing legislation 5 -- the
drafters of the Salvage Rider explicitly removed this possibility for court
review."
The third issue concerns the appropriate level of judicial deference to
agency expertise. Deference is customary when the agency has technical
expertise that may be applied to complex management or rulemaking
problems in the absence of specific statutory guidance. 9 This standard
was clearly enunciated in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 6
when the Court said, "because analysis of the relevant documents 'requires
a high level of technical expertise,' we must defer to 'the informed discre-
tion of the responsible federal agencies.""'6 Expert agencies are entitled
to this expertise-based discretion even "if, as an original matter, a court
might find contrary views more persuasive."62
Deference is also due an agency's interpretation of its own statutes.
In Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Defense Council, Supreme Court Justice
Stevens clearly defined the test for when an agency must be accorded
deference to interpret congressional language:
[T]he Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommoda-
tion of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves
reconciling conflicting policies.'
The fourth issue arises when the deference due an agency varies ac-
cording to whether the agency is continuing an old and established policy
also Shapiro, supra note 41, at 1490.
56. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410.
57. See Shapiro, supra note 41, at 1490.
58. Note that in the Salvage Rider, § 2001, Congress explicitly gave the Forest Service sole
discretion to determine how to fulfill its commitments relative to a wide range of its organic acts and
environmental laws. See infra note 126-129 and accompanying text.
59. See Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, supra note 14, at 2084; see also
Horwitz, supra note 46, at 159.
60. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
61. Id. at 377 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)).
62. Id. at 378. However, the court must satisfy itself that the agency did in fact consider the
information in the record before reaching its decision. Id.
63. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (citations omitted).
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or embarking in a new direction.' However, as Chevron demonstrates,
nothing prevents an agency from proceeding in new directions, or creating
new policies, so long as they have made a permissible construction of the
statute.' Thus, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, an agency may de-
velop its own policies, even if its interpretations differ from ones that it
used previously.'
Finally, courts have generally found that unless ordered to do some-
thing by Congress, agencies have the discretion under the APA to do
nothing.67 Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in Heckler v. Chaney, set
four criteria for determining whether an agency's decision not to act is
reviewable:
(1) an agency flatly claims that it has no statutory jurisdiction to reach
certain conduct... ; (2) an agency engages in a pattern of non-enforce-
ment of clear statutory language... ; (3) an agency has refused to en-
force a regulation lawfully promulgated and still in effect... ; or (4) a
non-enforcement decision violates constitutional rights .... 68
It is the third criterion, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, that
will become important in our subsequent discussion.
With these considerations in mind, the Supreme Court, in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,69
established a four-part test for agency behavior.0 An agency action will
be found "arbitrary and capricious" if:
[T]he agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.7 '
State trust land administrators usually operate under equivalent state
administrative law principles when they are acting primarily as administra-
tors. These same issues generally emerge when the trustee is challenged
by a lessee. However, trustees obligations to the beneficiaries are defined
64. See Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, supra note 14, at 2101-02.
65. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
66. See id. at 865-66.
67. See, e.g., Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832-33. This classic Supreme Court case decided whether the
federal Food and Drug Administration could be required under the APA to prevent uses of certain
medicines for the purposes of lawful lethal injection. See id. at 823-24.
68. Id. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
70. 1i at 43.
71. Id.
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by a set of trusteeship requirements that elaborate on, and occasionally
redefine, the contours of the basic APA concepts.
B. Review of State Land Trustees' Decisions
To underscore the conceptual distinctions between administrators and
trustees, we pose the same five questions, those that structured our APA
discussion, to address the prudence standard: 1) who may ask for court
review of the trustee's decisions; 2) how much discretion is invested in the
trustee; 3) how does deference to the trustee's technical expertise work; 4)
what are expectations for the trustee to adjust previous policies; and 5) can
the trustee be required to take action? What we find is that most of these
issues are either irrelevant, or they are collapsed into an evaluation of
whether the trustee has acted prudently and with undivided loyalty to the
beneficiary.
The first question, that of standing, arises in some jurisdictions in the
trust context, but it is configured differently than under the APA. The
question is not framed in terms of a plaintiff establishing sufficient injury
to warrant a hearing, but in terms of the identifying beneficiaries of the
trust in question. Almost without exception, taxpayers in a state are con-
sidered to be beneficiaries, and are found to have sufficient interest to
challenge the trustee. For the two states which do not follow this rule-
Minnesota and Idaho-the stricter standard has had significant conse-
quences for trust management.' Accordingly the issue of standing rarely
arises in trust lands cases,73 which advantages those who would challenge
a trustee.
The second question-what, if anything, is "committed by law to
agency discretion" and therefore unreviewable by the courts-also does
not arise in review of trustees' decisions. That question arises from the
separation of powers doctrine, which defines the appropriate relationship
72. See supra notes 23-24; see also Testimony of Charles Graham, U.S. Senate Subcommittee
on Forests and Public Land Management, Workshop on Title VI Public Land Management Re-
sponsibility and Accountability Restoration Act, March 6, 1997; see also Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n,
Inc. v. State of Idaho, 899 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1995). The court in Selkirk-Priest did leave one small
crack open for the state's taxpayers to gain standing: the possibility that their interest in the public
trust aspects of navigable streams running through the contested timber sale area might give them
standing. The Idaho legislature acted promptly to exclude operation of the public trust doctrine from
endowment and other state lands. The timber industry also successfully sought legislation providing
that anyone seeking to enjoin a timber sale must post a 10% bond. Revisions to the Idaho APA, more-
over, created an exception for endowment land timber sales, which are no longer subject to judicial
review under the Idaho APA. Personal communication with Laird Lucas, Attorney for the Selkirk-
Priest Basin Association, March 17, 1996, Boise, Idaho, and Steve Schuster, Idaho State Land Board
attorney handling Selkirk-Priest, March 18, 1996.
73. See Souder et al., supra note 38, n.66 and text accompanying, regarding the meaning of the
state constitutional phrase "in trust for all the people" for the issue of standing.
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between the courts and the legislature in our system of government. The
court is careful to stay within, or at least to talk about staying within, its
constitutionally allocated domain. This question has no analogue in the
trust setting where the courts are called upon to apply trust principles to
what is essentially a contract framed by the trustor. Occasionally, terms in
a specific trust instrument may take some steps toward defining the nature
and extent of the trustee's discretion. Phrases such as "in the trustee's
discretion," "all of the powers of an owner," "absolute" or "sole and un-
controlled" are common and can expand or contract the degree of caution
required of the trustee. However, such terms never alter the trustee's du-
ties of loyalty and care and general risk reduction.74 Again, this seems to
advantage those who would challenge the trustee.
Hence, the third question-the issue of deference to an agency's
technical expertise-emerges as a central consideration in evaluating a
trustee's decisions. However, the question of expertise has a significantly
different shape in the context of prudence than in the APA setting. Three
points seem crucial. First, unlike the APA standard, under which the
administrator's discretion ebbs and flows depending on the disposition of
the court at a given point in time, the standards for evaluating trustees
vary according to the amount of expertise the trustee claims to, or appears
to, possess. When the trustee is an expert in a specific field, and is com-
pensated for her work in that field, then she is expected to make decisions
with a higher degree of proficiency than an "average" prudent person. If
the trustee is making decisions outside her field of expertise, then her
actions will be evaluated against a more forgiving standard of care.75 The
basic decision-making criterion within trust law is normally expressed in
terms of the "prudent person" or "prudent investor" rule: How would a
person of similar expertise make a decision regarding his or her own
funds?76 Simply put, the courts expect more from Merrill Lynch when it
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 228 (cmt. g) (Prudent Investor Rule).
75. RESTATEMENT (TrDM) OF TRUSTS § 227, comment d states:
The duty to exercise both care and skill in investment management may require knowledge
and experience greater than that of an individual of ordinary intelligence, depending on the
investment strategy to be employed. This does not prevent an ordinarily intelligent person
from serving as a trustee. In that role, however, such a person may have to take reasonable
steps to obtain sufficient competent advice, guidance, and assistance in order to meet the
standards of this Section and to formulate and implement a prudent investment strategy for
the particular trust.
76. See § 227(a). But this requirement isn't in isolation:
To the extent necessary or appropriate to making of informed investment judgments by the
particular trustee, care also involves securing and considering the advice of others on a
reasonable basis. It is ordinarily satisfactory that this information and advice be obtained
from sources on which prudent investors in the community customarily rely.
§ 227 (Cmt. d).
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is managing a fund for a minor child than when a friend of the family
undertakes the same task.
A second point related to expertise is that rather than turning explicit-
ly on the volume of data accumulated to support a specific decision, when
alternative courses of action are available, trust law requires the explicit
incorporation of risk/return analysis in the decision-making process.'
Trust law has become increasingly sophisticated in the standards by which
the courts judge appropriate incorporation of the relationship between risk
and return. In the Second Restatement of Trusts, and for the last seventy-
five to one hundred years, that matter was straightforward and confining:
trustees were generally provided with an "approved list" of acceptable
investments.78 Trustees who made decisions based on the approved list
were unquestionably acting prudently. More recently, with the growth of
sophisticated financial markets, theories, and analytical tools, the concept
of balancing risks in a diversified "portfolio" as a way to reduce financial
risk has become prevalent. The principles of prudence have been restated
to emphasize risk management: "sound diversification" of the portfolio;
analysis of the degree of risk appropriate to the goals of the trust; avoid-
ance of transaction costs; and balancing returns between production of
current income and the protection of purchasing power.79
This is not only a different standard than that operative under the
APA regarding agencies claiming to be expert in a particular field, it
would seem to be both more specific and more demanding. This is be-
cause a court is under no compunction to defer to the expertise of the
trustee. Frequently, the process of weighing the pros and cons of a
trustee's decision has trappings similar to the review of an administrative
decision. However, deference is not in the trust dictionary. The court ap-
plies the "Prudent Investor Rule," irrespective of how complex the matter
becomes or how little or how much the trustee knows.
A third point related to the deference to expertise is worth mention-
ing: federal administrators are frequently required-either by interpreta-
tions of the APA, NEPA, or by the agency's authorizing statutes -- to
propose and evaluate a number of alternatives and scenarios, including the
alternative of taking no action, and other hypothetical options.8 Trustees
are not so constrained, although in practice, as we shall see below, they
frequently perform a similar analysis. Finally, this should suggest that the
77. See § 227.
78. See discussion at § 227 (crmt. k).
79. See § 227 (introduction).
80. See Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 620.
81. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE PUBLIC TIMBER: FEDERAL AND STATE PROGRAMS
DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY IN PACIFIC NORTHWEST 4-6 (1996).
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other category of deference-that owed to an agency's interpretation of its
own statutory mandate-is also an empty cell. The courts are quite famil-
iar with the nature of the trust doctrine and interpreting it is squarely with-
in their domain.
The fourth question-the relationship between new versus established
policy--does arise in the trust context. Trustees are expected to utilize the
most recent information in the transaction of their duties.82 The intent of
the shift from the traditional practice of providing legally approved lists of
prudent investments to relying on the "Prudent Investor Rule"-that is, the
shift from the Second83 to the Third Restatement of Trustss---was to
"liberat[e] expert trustees to pursue challenging, rewarding, non-traditional
strategies when appropriate to the particular trust, [and to provide] reason-
ably clear guidance to safe harbors that are practical, adaptable, readily
identifiable, and expectedly rewarding. '' 5 However, trustees are not freed
from the requirement to act with care and diligence: trustees are warned
that if they depart from widely used standards, they must make an in-
formed and careful analysis of the risks.86 Thus, the ability of the trustee
to incorporate new knowledge and techniques is tempered by the funda-
mental requirement to carefully evaluate the risks associated with doing
SO.
The fifth key question-is the manager allowed to decline to pursue a
course of action--commonly arises in trust law. Basically, the trustee has
broad discretion not to act, as long as inaction can be demonstrated to be
prudent. Can the trustee withhold resources from productive use, to wait
for a better market or a clearer understanding of the risks? The answer is
clearly yes: courts would likely not consider this inaction, but rather pru-
dent action that is clearly acceptable trustee behavior if the risks outweigh
the retumsY Inaction is also acceptable if the costs--"transaction
costs"-outweigh the potential benefits."
82. "Trust investment law should reflect and accommodate current knowledge and concepts. It
should also avoid repeating the mistake of freezing its rules against future learning and developments."
RFSTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TRusTs § 227.
83. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 230.
84. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (Prudent Investor Rule).
85. Id.
86. "Furthermore, although it is 6rdinarily helpful in justifying the reasonableness of a trustee's
conduct to show that an investment or strategy is widely used by trustees in comparable trust situa-
tions, the absence of such use does not render imprudent the informed, careful use of unconventional
assets or techniques." § 227 (cmt. e).
87. See § 229 (cmt. b); see also Souder et al., supra note 38.
88. See § 227(c)(3) ("incur only costs that are reasonable in amount and appropriate to the
investment responsibilities of the trusteeship?).
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III. AGENCY DECISIONS IN SALVAGE TIMBER SALES
This background on the basic structure of judicial review of agency
decisions has suggested some differences between the state trust land and
Forest Service contexts. In this section we will provide background on
salvage sales-the basic concept, and the peculiar chain of events that has
caused so much controversy on federal lands. We will briefly examine
salvage timber harvests from the inception of forest reserve "management"
in 1897, through the Monongahela litigation, the National Forest Manage-
ment Act, and implementation of the Rescissions Act. This discussion will
put some meat on the bones of the cases to be discussed in the next sec-
tion and, in addition, suggest why the salvage issue is such a good context
for comparing judicial review of Forest Service and state trustee decisions.
A. Pre-1994 Timber Salvage on Federal Lands
Harvesting fire- and bug-killed and wind-thrown trees was traditional-
ly undertaken with little controversy; usually the biggest concern was how
to expeditiously remove these trees with as little damage to remaining live
trees and as little loss in their salvage value as possible. 9 In fact, it is not
too extreme to assert that the Forest Service's Organic Act (Organic
Act)' authorized primarily salvage harvests.9 ' In response to criticisms
that the forest reserves were "locked up" and unavailable to settlers, the
1897 Organic Act authorized the Secretary to promulgate regulations that
would allow limited use of the resources in the forest reserves.93 As the
89. See James W. Kimmey, "Rate of Deterioration of Fire-killed Timber in California,"
U.S.D.A. Forest Service Circular No. 962 (1955).
90. The Organic Act was repealed by the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA).
See Pub. L. No. 94-588 § 13, 90 Stat. 2958 (1976)). NFMA is now codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-
1614 (1994).
91. See generally, Sally K. Fairfax, "Legislative Intent and Forest Reserves," unpublished paper
briefly summarized in Sally K. Fairfax & A. Dan Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A Critical Anal-
ysis of United States v. New Mexico, 15 Idaho L. Rev. 509 (1979) (Fairfax paper on file with authors).
92. See, e.g., Our Unavailable Public Lands, 26 THE NATION 288 (May 2, 1878); JOHN IS,
THE UNrrED STATES FOREST POLICY, 69 (1920). Ise describes the widely lamented Free Timber Act
of 1891 (26 Stat. 1095) as being justified because:
[O]ne reason why the western men felt that they were entitled to free timber, even for man-
ufacturing purposes [i.e., as fuel for smelting], was that forest fires were destroying im-
mense amounts of timber each year anyhow, and there was no apparent reason why timber
should not be used rather than allowed to go up in smoke.
Id. at 69.
93. See Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 551. The debate was intense even within the western states
where Congressmen would have been thought more sympathetic to logging:
I myself should prefer that no clause should be retained in the bill permitting the cutting of
a single thousand feet of either dead or matured timber. But it was represented to us that it
is absolutely necessary that the dead timber should be eliminated from the forest ....
Statement of Representative Hermann of Oregon on the amendment to H.R. 119 (1893), which subse-
quently became the Organic Act. CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND
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Forest Service discovered in the early 1970s Monongahela litigation,94
the Organic Act did not in fact authorize manipulation of the vegetation to
produce trees, nor did it allow clear-cutting or the harvest of green trees.
Instead, the Organic Act stated that "[flor the purpose of preserving the
living and growing timber and promoting the younger growth," the Secre-
tary could cause to be appraised, "dead, matured... trees" and could sell
them if they were marked and designated, cut, and removed under the
supervision of the Secretary's appointee.95 Removal of dead and mature
trees that are interfering with the living and growing timber is effectively
a salvage sale.
After the forest reserves were transferred to the Department of Agri-
culture and brought under the umbrella of Gifford Pinchot's enthusiastic
embrace of silviculture and "forestry in the woods," the limited extent of
the grant of authority to cut timber was forgotten or ignored.' The Forest
Service responded to increased demands for stumpage after World War II
by clear-cutting,' which led in the mid-1970s to the Monongahela litiga-
tion. Conservationists challenged the management of young and growing
timber in eastern National Forests. The court held, in what is frequently
delimited as a decision on clear-cutting, that Forest Service's green timber
sales program was illegal." The case prompted Congress to rewrite the
Forest Service's statutory authorities to allow for timber management be-
yond that authorized in the 1897 Organic Act.
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA),99 which followed
the Monongahela decision, defines a convoluted process for preparing for-
est management plans. Although salvage is discussed in NFMA in section
14(h),"° salvage sales are lightly treated in the national forest planning
documents."' Nevertheless, given the intensity of fire and insect infesta-
RESOuRcE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 50 & n.247 (1987) (citing 27 CONG. REC. 86
(1894)).
94. See West Virginia Div. of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945
(4th Cir. 1975) (Monongahela).
95. Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 476 (repealed by NFMA, Pub. L. No. 94-588 § 13, 90 Stat. 2958
(1976)).
96. See IsE, supra note 92, at 143, 155, 161-62.
97. Monongahela, 522 F.2d at 954-55; see also WILKNSON & ANDERSON, supra note 93, at
136-39.
98. See Monongahela, 522 F.2d at 955.
99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 472a(h). Specific salvage sale procedures are outlined in the FOREST SER-
VICE MANUAI, §§ 2435-2436, especially § 2435.3, entitled 'Emergency Salvage Sales," and amend-
ment 2400-9-6 to §§ 2435-2435.4 (September 24, 1996).
101. See, e.g., PROPOSED KAiBAB (ARIz.) NATIONAL FOREST PLAN (June, 1994). This plan men-
tions salvage in only two places: first under "Vegetative Treatment Practices," "[s]alvage cutting is
applied in stands that have been devastated by wildfire, insect or disease." Id. at 22ff. As the name
implies, this harvest is not anticipated and is applied to "salvage standing dead or dying trees for corn-
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tions in the 1980s and early 1990s, controversy over salvage timber har-
vesting intensified and became a central public resources management is-
sue."° Figure 1 shows the increasing importance of salvage harvests in
relation to green, "live tree" harvests on the National Forests over the past
twenty years. It is important to note, therefore, that when salvage sales are
referenced in NFMA, they appear primarily in the context of exceptions to
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Figure 1. Timber salvage sales in relation to green timber sales on National Forests,
1977 - 1996.'04
It is not surprising that salvage sales are exempted from NFMA re-
quirements regarding the age at which trees can be harvested. The cutting
age (or rotation age for even-aged stands) is defined as the "culmination
of the mean annual increment of growth."' 5 This point arrives when the
annual biological growth rate of an individual tree reaches its peak and
stabilizes or declines.'" Clearly, when contemplating salvaging trees that
mercial purposes that would otherwise remain in the forest" Id. at 24. However, this practice is applied
only in "Suitable Coniferous Forest Timberland," and not forest-wide. Second, according to the
"Guidelines for Timber Resource Operations and Improvements," "[s]alvage stands, or parts thereof,
that are moderately or severely damaged by dwarf mistletoe, insects, fire, or windthrow [are harvested]
using the uniform shelterwood or clearcutting with planting methods . I..." Id  at 42.
102. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Salvage Timber, 93 J. FORESTRY 60 (July 1995).
103. The principal commentary on NFMA does not even mention salvage timber harvests. See
generally, WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 93.
104. Source: GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at App. I, at 20.
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(m).
106. L. DAVIS & K. JOHNSON, FOREST MANAGEMENT 51-52 (3d. ed. 1987).
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are dead or dying for whatever reason, their biological growth rate is
presumed to be zero. Salvage sales are therefore exempted from NFMA's
harvest age requirements." °e
A more significant exception in section 6 of NFMA exempts salvage
sales from criteria and procedures for determining whether specific areas
are "unsuitable for timber production."'" s This determination is based on
physical and economic factors."°9 Even in areas considered to be "unsuit-
able" for timber harvest, salvage harvesting could be conducted if, by
doing so, other multiple-use values were protected.'
Salvage sales are also exempted from calculations of the "allowable
sale quantity" (ASQ). As a part of a forest plan, the agency is required to
develop an ASQ based on the level that provides a sustained yield which
does not vary significantly over time."' NFMA allows the Forest Service
two options for dealing with salvage sales: salvage can be treated as re-
placement for green timber sales m considering the ASQ. 2 Tius has a
certain intuitive appeal, since when trees die they no longer contribute to
future sustained yields. But, alternately, the Forest Service may simply
harvest the total ASQ of green trees in addition to any salvage." 3
107. Section 6 states:
The Secretary shall establish standards to insure that, prior to harvest, stands of trees
throughout the National Forest System shall generally have reached the culmination of
mean annual increment of growth Provided, That these standards shall not preclude
the use of sound silvicultural practices, such as thaing or other stand improvement mea-
sums: Provtdedfwirther, That these standards shall not preclude the Secretary from salvage
or sanitation harvesting of timber stands wich are substantially damaged by fire,
windthrow or other catastrophe, or wich are in munment danger from insect or disease at-
tack
16 U.S.C. § 1604(m)(1).
108. § 1604(k).
109. § 1604(g)(3)(E) places restrictions on areas suitable for harvesting where necessary to pre-
vent damage due to unstable soils, to assure restocking capability of the land, and to protect streams
and riparian areas.
110. 16 U.S.C. § 1611(b) provides:
In developing land management plans pursuant to this Act, the Secretary shall identify
lands within the management area which are not suited for timber production, considering
physical, economic, and other pertinent factors to the extent feasible, as determined by the
Secretary, and shall assure that, except for salvage sales or sales necessitated to protect
other multiple-use values, no timber harvesting shall occur on such lands for a period of 10
years. Lands once identified as unsuitable for timber production shall continue to be treated
for reforestation purposes, particularly with regard to the protection of other multiple-use
values.
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1611(a).
112. 16 U.S.C. § 1611(b) states:
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall prohibit the Secretary from salvage or sanita-
tion harvesting of timber stands which are substantially damaged by fire, windthrow, or
other catastrophe, or wich are m mminment danger from insect or disease attack. The Sec-
retary may either substitute such timber for timber that would otherwise be sold under the
plan or, if not feasible, sell such timber over and above the plan volume.
113. Id. This provision is pertinent to the discussion of the Rescissions Act. See infra note 124
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Finally, salvage sales enjoy minor exceptions from the clear-cutting
requirements of section 6. Clear-cutting is to be used only if it is the "op-
timum" method, or to meet management objectives; 4 and if environ-
mental and other impacts on each sale area of even-aged management
techniques are assessed by an inter-disciplinary team and determined to be
consistent with multiple use of the area;" 5 and the cutting patterns are
blended with the natural terrain."6 Even then, NFMA limits the size of
cutting units;. 7 and requires that planned harvesting be carried out in a
manner that protects other resources and the regeneration potential for the
site.' For the most part, salvage clear-cuts must meet the normal re-
quirements, but they are exempted from the harvest size limits."9
Salvage sales are no longer regarded as normal timber sales after the
passage of NFMA. They are subject to far less stringent review. In 1994,
Congress, concerned (some would say irate) that the Forest Service was
moving so slowly to harvest fire- and bug-kill timber, went even further to
limit restrictions on salvage sales by passing the Recessions Act.
B. The Rescissions Act Timber Salvage Rider
After the 1994 fire season, the new Republican Congress was con-
cerned that diverse environmental laws and regulations were inhibiting the
Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) from expedi-
tiously salvaging fire and insect damaged trees."2 Congress attached a
rider (the "Salvage Rider") onto an act rescinding the administration's
previously authorized funding allocations (the Rescissions Act or the
Act). Intense controversy arose from the fact that the rider overrode
and accompanying text (quoting relevant language from the Rescissions Act).
114. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(3)(F).




119. In this even-aged management criteria, the Forest Service is required to:
[E]stablish[] according to geographic areas, forest types, or other suitable classifications the
maximum size limits for areas to be cut in one harvest operation, including.., appropriate
public notice and review by the responsible Forest Service officer one level above the For-
est Service officer who normally would approve the harvest proposal: Provided, That such
limits shall not apply to the size of areas harvested as a result of natural catastrophic condi-
tions such as fire, insect and disease attack, or windstorm...
§ 1604(g)(3)(F)(iv).
120. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
121. Id. Some environmentalists objected to the fact that the salvage program was developed as
a "rider" to an appropriation's bill, but such concerns are formulaic. The 1891 act setting apart forest
reserves, and the 1897 Organic Act also passed as riders on appropriation bills. See Oliver A. Houck,
The Water, the Trees, and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases that Changed the American Land-
scape, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2279, 2293 & n.75; CELA CAMPBELL-MoHN ET AL., SusTAINABLE ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW § 9.1 & n.71 (1993).
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many of the laws" which environmentalists traditionally used to chal-
lenge the Forest Service's predilection to focus on timber over other re-
sources. 12
The Rescissions Act defines a "salvage timber sale" as:
[A] timber sale for which an important reason for entry includes the
removal of disease- or insect-infested trees, dead, damaged, or down*
trees, trees affected by fire or imminently susceptible to fire or insect
attack. Such term also includes the removal of associated trees or trees
lacking the characteristics of a healthy and viable ecosystem for the pur-
pose of ecosystem improvement or rehabilitation, except that any such
sale must include an identifiable salvage component of trees described in
the first sentence."
The Forest Service was required to put up for sale four and a half
billion board feet [plus or minus twenty-five percent] over the two year
period established by the Act. Evincing their impatience with Forest Ser-
vice foot-dragging on salvage operations, Congress required the agency to
report every six months on regional and forest-level progress towards
meeting that target."
The most important provisions of the Salvage Rider directs that a
combined environmental analysis (EA) and biological evaluation (BE) be
prepared as part of each salvage sale, but grants the relevant Secretaries
absolute discretion to define the intensity and content of those analyses:
... a document embodying decisions relating to salvage timber sales
proposed under authority of this section shall, at the sole discretion of the
Secretary concerned and to the extent the Secretary concerned considers
appropriate and feasible, consider the environmental effects of the sal-
vage timber sale and the effect, if any, on threatened or endangered
species, and to the extent the Secretary concerned, at his sole discretion,
considers appropriate and feasible, be consistent with any standards and
guidelines from the management plans applicable to the National For-
est... on which the salvage timber sale occurs."
122. See Salvage Timber & Forest Health-Part II: Oversight Hearings Before the Task Force on
Salvage Timber & Forest Health of the Committee on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1996)
(statement of Patti Goldman, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, "Logging without Laws Rider Law-
lessness Fuels the Industry's Greed at the Expense of Our Nation's Forests").
123. See EUsE S. JONEs & CAMERON P. TAYLOR, Litigating Agency Change: The Impact of the
Courts and Administrative Appeals on the Forest Service, 23 POL'Y STUD. J. 310, 312-14 (1995).
124. Rescissions Act, § 2001(a)(3) (found as "Statutory Note" at 16 U.S.C.A § 1611(a)(3) (1996
& Supp. 1997)).
125. See Rescissions Act, § 2001(c)(3); see, e.g., U.S. Forest Service, Report to Congress, (Feb-
ruary 29, 1996).
126. Rescissions Act, § 2001(c)(1)(A).
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The requirements of all federal environmental and natural resource
laws are satisfied by completion of the combined EAIBE. 12 Adminis-
trative appeals of the EA/BE and their Decision Notice are expressly pro-
hibited," although courts can apply provisions of the APA to review
challenges to the exercise of administrative discretion.29
The Salvage Rider also exempts sales under its provisions from stan-
dard contracting requirements, including competitive bidding, federal
acquisition regulations, notice and publication requirements, and any im-
plementing regulations and departmental acquisition regulations.' Final-
ly, salvage sales under this Salvage Rider are not required to be cost effec-
tive.' The Salvage Rider expired on December 31, 1996, although it
remains in effect until the timber sold pursuant to its provisions is harvest-
ed.'32
C. How Salvage Timber is Handled Under the Rescissions Act
Three additional documents govern how the Forest Service conducts
salvage sales under the Rescissions Act. First, the Departments of Agricul-
ture, Interior, Commerce, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which specified how
the Departments and relevant agencies (Forest Service, BLM, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service (USFWS), and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS)) will conduct operations in the altered legal environment created
by the Rescissions Bill.' In addition, a year after passage of the original
Bill, in July, 1996, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the For-
est Service each provided specific clarification on how salvage sales were
to be conducted.
The MOA describes how agencies which sell timber under the Sal-
vage Rider (the Forest Service and BLM) coordinate with the agencies
they consult on normal harvests: USFWS and NMFS regarding endan-
gered species, and the EPA for the Clear Air Act and Clean Water Act
aspects of timber harvesting. The MOA announced five key principles:
1. Salvage sales will be implemented with the same substan-




130. See § 2001(c)(5)(b) (citing, inter alia, 41 U.S.C. §§ 253-254).
131. See § 2001(b)(1).
132. See § 20010).
133. See Memorandum of Agreement on Timber Salvage Related Activities Under Public Law
104-19 Between the United States Department of Agriculture, United States Department of Interior,
United States Department of Commerce, and United States Environmental Protection Agency (August
9, 1995) (on file with the authors).
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2. The public will be involved early in the process so that
input can be provided in the design of the projects; this provi-
sion specifically requires a higher degree of input because ad-
ministrative appeals are prohibited.
3. The agency will perform a scoping period during prepara-
tion of the salvage projects, and circulation of the EA/BE and a
twenty-day comment period for projects that would normally
have an environmental assessment (i.e., no significant environ-
mental impact) and thirty days for documents that would nor-
mally have an environmental impact statement prepared. The
decision maker must respond to substantive comments in the
final EA/BE, but circulation of this final document is not re-
quired.
4. Monitoring and evaluation of the timber sale objectives and
mitigation will be performed as an integral part of the salvage
sales; monitoring must follow applicable Forest Plans, Land Use
Plans, and agency direction. Public and stakeholder involvement
in monitoring and evaluation is encouraged.
5. Recognize that, given the flexibility granted the agencies,
"care must be taken to avoid abuse by including trees or areas
not consistent with current environmental lands and existing
standards and guidelines .... . 34
In response to public concerns raised about implementation of the
Salvage Rider, the Secretary of Agriculture provided new guidelines to the
Forest Service on July 2, 1996. The new guidelines provide specific di-
rection on where salvage logging may not occur under the Rider, what
trees are to be considered harvestable, and additional details about public
involvement. Three items are key:
1. No salvage sales may occur in inventoried roadless areas.
2. Sale preparation, including marking, may proceed prior to
the Decision Notice so that the planned action can be clearly
displayed to the public.
3. Justification for including green trees and trees "imminently
susceptible" to insect attack or fire must be included in the envi-
ronmental assessment using a systematic process to demonstrate
that the decision is "well reasoned and well founded." This
system should provide a vehicle for public participation. 31
134. ld.
135. Memorandum from the Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, to Jack Ward Thomas, Chief,
U.S. Forest Service, Revised Direction for Emergency Timber Salvage Sales Conducted Under Section
2001(b) of P.L. 104-19 (July 2, 1996) reprinted as Exhibit 2, Interim Directive 2430-96-1, FoREST
SERVICE MANUAL (July 17, 1996).
19971
190 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
One week later, the Secretary of Agriculture provided additional
clarification of the timing of Forest Service salvage projects. The Secretary
stated that all salvage sales then being offered must be offered under the
provisions of Salvage Rider until its expiration.'36 However, any sales
that had not been advertised as of December 13, 1996 were to be with-
drawn.' 31 The Salvage Rider came to an end on Forest Service lands a
full two weeks prior to its intended expiration date. Thus, twenty-six sales
totaling thirty million board feet that were ready for sale, and could have
been advertised under the Rider prior to its expiration, were put on hold.
These, in some form or another, are likely to be sold under standard
NFMA salvage provisions, with the usual NEPA analysis, after January 1,
1997.3
In the end, the primary impact of the Salvage Rider on salvage sales
has been two fold. First, pre-Rescissions Act appeal regulations were
nullified as they applied to salvage sales. Second, because many operating
statutory mandates were suspended, judicial review of agency decisions
was largely restricted to an application of APA criteria. Hence, the review
of Rescission Act salvage operations provides an excellent opportunity to
view the APA operating almost in isolation.
IV. CASE STUDIES OF STATE AND FEDERAL SALVAGE PROJECTS
The combination of a brief introduction to judicial criteria for review
of agency and trustee decisions and to salvage sales and the Salvage Rider
gets us to the heart of the matter: how does the difference between the
APA and the trust doctrine play out in review of comparable policies? We
will focus on two cases: the Thunderbolt Timber Salvage Sale in the Boise
and Payette National Forests in central Idaho, and the Loomis State Forest
in north-central Washington.
A. Judicial Review Under the APA-
Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas
Timber salvage operations conducted under the Rescissions Act
spawned a huge public outcry and a number of court challenges. 39 Each
136. See id.
137. Memorandum from the Undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture, to the Chief, U.S. Forest Service, (December 13, 1996) cited in GAO Report, supra
note 33, at 7.
138. Id. at 6-7.
139. See, e.g., Kentucky Heartwood v. United States Forest Service, 906 F.Supp. 410 (E.D. Ky.
1995); Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman, 911 F.Supp. 431 (D. Mont. 1995), affd, 88
F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996); Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 917 F.Supp. 1458 (D. Idaho 1995),
affd, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792 (9th
Cir. 1996).
REVIEW OF TIMBER SALVAGE SALES
case raises a number of issues particular to the fact pattem-whether the
Forest Service was adequately protecting endangered species during its
salvage sales,'" whether the Secretary had to personally approve each
sale,"" and whether a particular project, if it had environmental docu-
mentation released to the public prior to enactment of the Salvage Rider,
qualified as "backlogged" salvage allowable under the Rescissions
Act."'42 The Idaho Conservation League's challenge to the Thunderbolt
Sale provides a clear juxtaposition to the Loomis State Forest controversy.
1. The Thunderbolt Sale
The sale at issue, within a sensitive drainage of the South Fork
Salmon River in the Boise and Payette National Forests, had a long histo-
ry even before the salvage sale issue presented itself.'43 The area sur-
rounding the South Fork Salmon River provides critical habitat for the
federally-threatened Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon.'" Se-
vere sedimentation problems caused by past land management activities,
especially logging and associated road building, were therefore of special
concern. 45 To address potential problems in the drainage, the Forest Ser-
vice developed special guidelines in the late-1980s. "The South Fork of
the Salmon River. An Area of Critical Concern" was the result of collabo-
ration with scientific experts and representatives from the timber industry,
other state and federal agencies, Indian tribes and environmental
groups." The Forest Service then amended the Boise and Payette Na-
tional Forest Plans to include those guidelines. 47 A key component of
the guidelines is the conclusion that "any new major land-disturbing ac-
tions... [would be] prohibited until restoration actions have improved in-
river conditions."'" In addition, the South Fork guidelines state that:
Impacts from a fire, or other natural events, may be unavoidable and
stabilizing the source of natural disturbance is not always biologically
desirable for aquatic ecosystems. More important is maintaining natural
140. See Kentucky Heartwood, 906 F. Supp. at 414.
141. This was a common complaint among the Salvage Rider cases. See, e.g., Inland Empire,
911 F. Supp. at 436; Inland Empire, 86 F.3d at 698; Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d at 1345.
142. See Kentucky Heartwood, 906 F. Supp. at 413.
143. Brief for Federal Appellees at 8-9, Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir.
1996).
144. Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d at 1347. The listing decision is at 56 Fed. Reg.
14,653, 14, 657, and 14,660 (1992).
145. 91 F.3d at 1347.
146. Id.
147. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, Idaho Conservation League.
148. Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d at 1347.
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stream dynamics. 49
Thus it would appear that any harvest operations in the drainage would be
problematic at best, and probably prohibited until the water quality prob-
lems could be adequately addressed.5
Forest Service planning for the area was interrupted by a spectacular
fire in 1994 that burned about 150,000 acres in the South Fork Salmon
River watershed, Payette and Boise National Forests, in central Idaho.'
The Thunderbolt Fire burned 18,827 acres 52 of this 150,000 acre total,
including 5,935 acres that burned at high intensity.'53 The agency re-
sponded to the Thunderbolt Fire by establishing a Landscape Assessment
Team to "assess how the fires affected various resources, and to determine
what management actions could be taken to meet the Forest Plan goal of
restoration of salmon and trout populations."'5 4 The resulting Thunder-
bolt Wildfire Recovery Project was intended to use management tools, in-
cluding salvage sales, to rehabilitate the area and improve water quality,
while capturing some of the value of dead and dying timber:
[To improve the long term fish habitat, rehabilitate existing sediment
sources, improve hydrologic conditions of affected watersheds, protect
long term soil productivity, promote revegetation of trees on burned
acres, and recover the economic value of dead and imminently dead trees
as a means of financing the ecosystem restoration and sediment reduction
projects.155
To fund the Recovery Project, the Forest Service proposed the sal-
vage of timber on 3,237 acres, harvesting 14 million board feet.'56 The
sale would provide approximately $780,000 to ameliorate existing sedi-
ment sources on roads and landings, to replant trees, and for other sedi-
ment-reduction projects.'57 In addition to partially funding restoration
projects, the timber salvage would also support timber-related jobs in local
communities."'
The salvage proposal was first submitted as a Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (DEIS) with an accompanying Biological Assessment in
149. Id. (quoting the South Fork guidelines).
150. See Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8-9, Idaho Conservation League.
151. Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d at 1347.
152. Id.
153. Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1461.
154. Brief for Federal Appellees at 10, Idaho Conservation League.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, Idaho Conservation League.
157. Brief for Federal Appellees at 33-35, Idaho Conservation League.
158. Brief of Appellee-Defendant-Intervenor Intermountain Forest Industry Association at 19,
Idaho Conservation League.
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March 1995, four months before the Salvage Rider passed. The proposed
harvest alternative "drew harsh and substantial criticism" from the EPA,
NMFS, and the USFWS, as well as from the Idaho Department of Game
and Fish."9 "In the unanimous opinion of these agencies, the environ-
mental risks posed by using salvage logging to finance restoration projects
were too great to render the Project acceptable."'" NMFS issued a Bio-
logical Opinion which stated that the salvage harvests would jeopardize
the continued existence of the spring/summer chinook salmon, and ad-
versely modify the salmon's critical habitat on the South Fork Salmon
River.' The EPA stated that the proposed salvage timber harvests
would "further aggravate the already critically degraded habitat for threat-
ened salmon," and that "the proposed action was inconsistent with collec-
tive agency decisions and resource protection goals for the South Fork
Salmon River Watershed."'' The USFWS similarly opposed the project
because it concluded the proposed actions would negate or delay any
restorative benefits that might result from the project."
One month before the Forest Service released the DEIS in March, it
convened an inter-agency "Blue Ribbon Panel" to review the science
applied to the soil and fisheries analysis in the rehabilitation proposals.'
This panel consisted of scientists affiliated with the EPA, USFWS, and the
Forest Service-but interestingly NMFS and Idaho Game and Fish were
not included. The panel was unable to reach a consensus because "the
action was not consistent with the LRMPs [Land and Resource Manage-
ment Plans] and would increase short-term risks of sediment and fuel
spills in trade-off for unproven long-term benefits.""les Faced with this
result, the Forest Service established a panel of its own employees to
examine the scientific standards for soils and fisheries analyses of the pro-
ject (the Science Panel). The Science Panel was "unable to conclude that
the analysis performed could support the DEIS prediction for long-term
habitat improvement in spawning and rearing habitat of anadromous
fish."' The Science Panel made six recommendations that its leader felt
159. Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1461.
160. The Forest Service took issue with this characterization, saying that the modified proposals
in its Record of Decision (ROD) were approved by the Idaho Division of Environmental Quality,
which is important because that agency implements the Clean Water Act for the state. Brief of Federal
Appellees at 27, Idaho Conservation League.
161. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13, Idaho Conservation League.
162. Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
163. Id. at 1462. The Idaho Dep't. of Fish and Game took a similar position. Id
164. Brief for Federal Appellees at 13, Idaho Conservation League..
165. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16 n.5, Idaho Conservative League.
166. Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d. at 1348. The Science Panel did, however, determine
that the Forest Service had used "the best analytical methods available for estimating erosion and
sediment delivery." Id.
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"were the best technically available."' 7
Between the Thunderbolt Salvage DEIS (released in March, 1995)
and the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) (released on Sep-
tember 12, 1995) and Record of Decision (ROD) (October 5, 1995), the
Rescissions Act was passed (July 25, 1995). As we have seen, it grants the
relevant Secretaries expanded discretion to identify means to meet the
goals of various review and consultation requirements which had previous-
ly governed salvage timber harvests.' When the Forest Service could
not agree with NMFS regarding its Biological Opinion, the two agencies
used MOA procedures to elevate the dispute to regional office level. When
a month of negotiations failed to resolve the issue, the Forest Service
unilaterally elevated the dispute to a committee of agency heads in Wash-
ington D.C."9 After reviewing the FEIS for two weeks, the Assistant
Administrator of NMFS "decided to defer to the Forest Service with re-
gard to the decision to proceed with the Thunderbolt Project."'' Given
the history of the sale and the events following the Thunderbolt fire, par-
ticularly the disagreement with NMFS over its jeopardy Biological Opin-
ion, and the fact that the project proposal was inconsistent with the Forest
Plans for the two National Forests, it seems reasonable to conclude that
the Forest Service could not have gone forward with the project absent the
discretion given to it under the Rescissions Act.'
2. The Challenge
After the ROD for the Thunderbolt Project was signed, the Idaho
Conservation League and the Wilderness Society brought suit to enjoin the
sale. The plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service's decision was arbitrary
and capricious for four reasons: 1) because it departed from past practices
and agreements; 2) because the receipts from the sale would not pay for
the recovery projects; 3) because the Forest Service did not concur with
the opinion of other agencies who had expertise and authority, both under
standard practices as well as under the Rider, regarding scientific interpre-
tations of potential project effects; and 4) because the agency proceeded
with the sale without resolving these differences of opinion. Of these the
second is the most important to our discussion. In arguing that the receipts
would not cover the costs of the restoration of the fire area, the plaintiffs
167. Brief for Federal Appellees at 14, Idaho Conservation League.
168. See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
169. Brief for Federal Appellees at 16-17, Idaho Conservation League.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Plaintiffs contended that the Forest Service had to amend the Forest Plans to legally pro-
ceed with the sales. See Opening Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants at 11, Idaho Conservation League.
The Forest Service responded that Forest Plans are continually amended as new conditions arise. See
Brief of Federal Appellees at 31-32, Idaho Conservation League.
REVIEW OF TIMBER SALVAGE SALES
specifically and explicitly argued that the benefits were not adequate to
justify incurring known risks to what all admitted was a sensitive area." 2
The court's treatment of this argument is central to our discussion of the
differences between prudential and APA evaluations of decisions.
The plaintiffs also charged that the Secretary of Agriculture had to
personally approve each salvage sale, and that certain documents which
were not in the agency's record should be admitted by the court as evi-
dence to substantiate their position.' The district court quickly denied
injunctive relief.174 The conservation groups appealed this decision to the
Ninth Circuit, using the same basic arguments. The appeals court, relying
largely upon the district court's opinion, rejected again the plaintiff's
claims in all three areas. 75 Because the court of appeals affirned the
district court on all issues, we will discuss the two stages of the litigation
together.
3. The Courts' Decisions
The district court quickly struck most of the materials that the plain-
tiffs wanted entered into the record,'76 and dispatched the peripheral con-
cers about who should sign the salvage sale documents.'" The Ninth
Circuit Court rejected an argument that the district court exceeded its
discretion in striking extra-record documents that were submitted as evi-
dence. '78 Two other issues are more important for our argument; the first
is standing. Protestations about standing post-Lujan179 to the contrary,
standing was never an issue, either for the conservation groups or for the
timber industry intervenors. If there are at some future point going to be
important distinctions between review of trustees and administrators under
the two review regimes, it is not apparent in this set of cases. At least in
the salvage sale setting, this remains a distinction without a difference.
The courts focussed more on the plaintiffs' arguments that the Forest
Service's decision to proceed with the sales in the face of considerable
disagreement with its sister agencies was arbitrary and capricious. 8' The
courts also considered the question of whether the sale would generate
adequate funds to pay for the identified restoration activities.' And be-
172. See Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. 1458, 1466 n.6 (D. Idaho 1995).
173. See Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1460; 91 F.3d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1996).
174. 917 F. Supp. at 1469.
175. 91 F.3d at 1349-50.
176. 917 F. Supp. at 1469.
177. Id. at 1468.
178. 91 F.3d at 1350.
179. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
180. See Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1463-65; 91 F.3d at 1349-50.
181. 917 F. Supp. at 1466-67; 91 F.3d at 1349-50.
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cause the findings on this funding issue directly relate to the comparison
between "arbitrary and capricious" and "prudent," we will focus on the
plaintiffs' argument and the defendant's response. However, we also want
to notice how the issue of receipts was addressed. Nowhere in the pro-
ceedings is there a suggestion that either court considered the issue of the
agency's technical conclusions about the financial consequences of the
harvest, as the plaintiffs urged. The courts never addressed the issue of
whether the harvest was an undeniable risk which was justified by the re-
turns-the funding the sale would provide for large-scale restoration of the
fire-scarred but crucial watershed. It is in this context that APA review is
most clearly different from the trust-based review.
Was the agency decision to essentially abrogate previous policies,
both the "South Fork guidelines" and the Forest Plan Amendments that
incorporated these guidelines, arbitrary and capricious?" The plaintiffs
argued that they had invested considerable time and effort over a number
of years to achieve the "consensus" guidelines. Their incorporation into
the Forest Service's management of the watersheds was an important
element of the Forest Service's authority.'83 The Forest Service, on the
other hand, argued that the fires had significantly changed watershed con-
ditions, much beyond anything anticipated in the Forest Plans, and that
these changed conditions justified its decisions to proceed with the salvage
project. 184
On this issue, both courts supported the agency. 8 "The Forest Ser-
vice conceded that the proposed Salvage Sale, which would authorize
logging from landslide prone Riparian Conservation Habitat Areas
(RCHAs), was inconsistent with established management policies for the
watershed.'"s The district court agreed, noting that without "the Rescis-
sions Act, the Salvage Sale could not be implemented without amending
the Land Resource Management Plans (LRMPs) for the Boise and Payette
National Forests.""' However, the Forest Service satisfied the court that
the changed conditions which resulted from the fire justified harvesting,
even though the area did not meet the interim Forest Plan standards."
Both courts allowed the Forest Service to alter its management because it
determined that the extent of the fires justified departure from previous
182. "When a Federal agency abruptly changes a long-standing, fundamental land management
policy, is that decision arbitrary and capricious if the agency provides no valid reason for changing
course in mid-stream?" Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Idaho Conservation League.
183. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8-9, Idaho Conservation League.
184. Id. at 10, 30-32.
185. Idaho Conservation League, 91 F.3d at 1349; 917 F. Supp. at 1464-67.
186. See Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1465.
187. Id. at 1465-66.
188. Id.
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standards." 9 This result was based solely on the extent of the fire, and
not on how the action would affect fish habitat."r
But what were the "changed conditions" that resulted from the fires,
and how would the actions proposed by the Forest Service either benefit
or hamper the recovery of the South Fork for suitable salmon and trout
habitat? The Forest Service contended that the 150,000-acre fire, and
especially those burned areas contiguous to the South Fork resulted in
changed conditions, particularly because only an average of four trees per
acre were likely to survive the effects of the fire."' While the plaintiff
conservation groups did not disagree, they contended that the activities
proposed by the Forest Service would exacerbate erosion and sedimenta-
tion problems." The defendants replied that logging activities associated
with harvesting the dead and dying trees would break up the "hydropho-
bic" 'l soil condition to allow water to infiltrate rather than run off, and
that limbs left on the slopes after the trunks are removed will slow down
surface flows. Because the salvage would be removed by helicopter, the
Forest Service contended that its operations would be "light on the
land.""' None of these assertions, however, satisfied any of the other
federal agencies, who still considered the risk of harvesting to outweigh
any benefits, either geological or financial, that would result. 95
The district court decision was filled with a familiar pastiche of stan-
dard APA interpretation verbiage-the agency has not "failed to articulate
'a rational connection between the facts found- and the choice made."' "96
The district court then found-and again the appeals court concurred-that
the Forest Service expert's analysis "provides the rational connection to
the Forest Service's decision to proceed."" The court noted that under
the arbitrary and capricious standard, review is "searching and careful, but
narrow, and the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agen-
cy.' 98
189. Id.; 91 F.3d at 1349.
190. See 917 F. Supp. at 1466; 91 F.3d at 1349.
191. Brief of Federal Appellees at 30, Idaho Conservation League.
192. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Idaho Conservation League.
193. Hydrophobic, or "water repelling" soils may be created after fires if vegetative litter on the
soil surface contains high levels of volatile organic compounds. These compounds are vaporized and
driven by high heat levels down into the soil where they condense to form a water repellent barrier.
ToO Koz.owsKi Er AL., THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ECOLOGY OF WOODY PLANTS, 411-12 (1991).
194. See Brief of Federal Appellees at 27, Idaho Conservation League.
195. See Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
196. Id. at 1464 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 US
29, 43 (1983)).
197. Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1465; 91 F.3d at 1349. Notably, neither court
used the Rescissions Act deference to agency interpretation as a basis for its decision.
198. 917 F. Supp. at 1464 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360,
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Next, the district court relied upon Marsh v. Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council, which embraced familiar language from Overton Park.
"When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discre-
tion to rely on the reasonable opinion of its own qualified experts, even if,
as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persua-
sive."' The district court held that the Forest Service had adequately
addressed NMFS' Biological Opinion concerns about the risk associated
with salvage harvesting." The court found: "The [Forest Service's]
analysis concluded that harvest activities will not significantly reduce the
probability of a landslide occurring. The analysis concluded that harvest
activities will not significantly reduce LWD recruitment due to full reten-
tion of trees within streamnside RHCA's."'
The district court followed the same logic in evaluating the plaintiffs
argument that the decision was arbitrary and capricious because the sale
"will not raise enough revenue to fund the restoration projects deemed
critical by the Forest Service in the FEIS or required by ... the Reces-
sions Act."' The court noted the express language of the Recessions
Act which provides that "salvage timber sales 'shall not be precluded
because the costs of such activities are likely to exceed the revenues de-
rived from such activities."'" Plaintiffs had asserted that when, "as
here, the Forest Service's only justification for the salvage sale is the
generation of funding for restoration projects, costs and revenues must be
considered." But because the court had already concluded "that the
Forest Service's decision to use the Salvage Sale to fund restoration is not
arbitrary and capricious," it declined to decide "whether [the] Recessions
Act would prohibit a contrary ruling.""5
Most of this reasoning was relegated to a footnote. The court went on
to simply agree with the Forest Service's numbers regarding funding for
the sale, finding itself:
[P]ersuaded that using the anticipated revenues from the Salvage Sale,
together with [other funds], the Forest Service will be able to fund the
specific projects to which it committed in the ROD. Accordingly, the
378 (1989)).
199. 917 F. Supp. at 1464 (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378, which cited Overton Park, 401 U.S.
at 416).
200. Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1465. The justification for concern over land-
slides does not address landslides, per se, but instead the recruitment of large woody debris vis-A-vis
the tree mortality marking guidelines. Id.
201. Id. (quoting the Forest Service's ROD, at 4).
202. Id. at 1466.
203. Id. at 1466 n.6.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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court finds that the Forest Service's decision to use the Salvage Sale to
finance the restoration projects was not arbitrary and capricious.
Thus, the courts determined that the Rescissions Act does not forbid sal-
vage sales just because the costs exceed the revenues. The point for us
here is that without ever getting to the effect of the Recessions Act on the
weighing of risks and benefits, the courts held that balancing risks and
benefits is not a part of the arbitrary and capricious analysis.
This brings us to the third issue: how is technical expertise to be
considered by the courts in deciding whether an agency's behavior was
arbitrary and capricious under the law? First, the Rescissions Act explicitly
deferred to the agency to decide whether a proposed action will meet the
standards required by the various environmental and natural resources
laws,' some of which-like the ESA-were administered by other fed-
eral agencies. So at least the authority to interpret laws under the Rescis-
sions Act is clear: it lies with the Forest Service.' But the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the Forest Service must still consider the opinions of outside
scientists' The Forest Service said that it did consider such opin-
ions---"for as long as it was productive" 21 -but that in the end, it was
entitled to rely on the expertise of its own employees."' The NMFS, the
EPAA, and the USFWS all have, as does the Forest Service, recognized
expertise in the areas of fisheries, fish habitat and water quality. The For-
est Service also has expertise related to the effects of silvicultural opera-
tions on soils. But the court deferred not simply to the most expert, but to
the agency responsible for the action. Basing its decision on Mount Gra-
ham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 2 the district court gave deference to the
agency when it had "substantial" expertise.' In the end, the district
court found that "nothwithstanding substantial interagency disagreement,
the Forest Service was entitled to rely on the opinions and analysis of its
own experts.
2 14
The Idaho Conservation League dispute provides a rare opportunity
to observe the courts applying APA standards with relatively little distor-
tion from surrounding authorizing statutes. Under those standards, the
206. Id. at 1467.
207. Rescissions Act, § 2001(c)(1)(4). See supra note 126-129 and accompanying text.
208. See Rescissions Act, § 2001(c)(1)(4).
209. See Opposition Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 26-30, Idaho Conservation League (argu-
ing that the Rescissions Act, § 2001(c)(4), requires decisions to be based on the analysis of the admin-
istrative record, including comments from outside agencies).
210. See Brief for Federal Appellees at 29, Idaho Conservation League.
211. Id. at 29-30.
212. 986 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1993).
213. Idaho Conservation League, 917 F. Supp. at 1464.
214. Id.
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courts deferred without much hesitation to the Forest Service's position.
B. Judicial Review Under the Prudence Standard-
Okanogan County v. Belcher
The context of the Okanogan County case21 is quite different from
that of the Thunderbolt dispute. In Okanogan County, beneficiaries of the
common school truse'6 sued the Washington Department of Natural Re-
sources (DNR), which acts as the manager of the trust lands and resourc-
es. The issue was not the familiar challenge to an allegedly undesirable
timber harvest, but the opposite. Plaintiffs complained that the DNR was
wrongly withholding timber from harvest. They charged that the trustee
was putting environmental interests ahead of its fundamental duty-to act
with undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries of the trust2 11-by over-com-
plying with environmental requirements, specifically, the ESA."' This
was a salvage issue because it arose in the context of a serious pine beetle
epidemic and an ostensibly accompanying fire hazard. The plaintiffs
charged that the trustee's delay in harvesting dead and damaged trees
caused both a loss of value in the infested timber and an acute risk of
catastrophic fire.219
1. State Management of the Loomis Forest
Prior to the late 1970s, the DNR did relatively little public planning
for the use of trust land resources. This rather casual approach, which
extended to timber harvest on state trust lands, ended when federal agen-
cies developed regulations and plans under the newly enacted NEPA,
NFMA and FLPMA forest planning statutes. Environmentalists challenged
DNR's claim that, because of the trust status of the lands, DNR was ex-
empt from the requirements of Washington's Environmental Policy Act
(SEPA), the state's "little NEPA."'  The DNR's putative exemption was
overturned in Noel v. Cole.2 The DNR responded to that adverse
215. Okanogan County v. Belcher, Court's Memorandum Decision (Chelan County Sup. Ct.
May 30, 1996) (No. 95-2-00867-9) [hereinafter Mem. Decision].
216. For a background on Washington State Forest issues and programs, see WASmNGTON
STATE BOARD OF NATURAL REsouiRCEs INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMM=ITEE, Report to the Washington
State Board of Natural Resources from the Independent Review Committee (June 22, 1995) (on file
with author), and Souder et al., supra note 38. The beneficiaries who brought the case include
Okanogan County and fourteen school districts.
217. The trustees' obligations are discussed briefly in this article, supra notes 74-79, 82-88 and
accompanying text, and more fully in STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
218. See Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Request for Mandatory and Injunctive Relief at
23-254, Okanogan County.
219. See id. at 2.
220. SEPA is codified at WASH. REv. CODE §§ 43.21C.010 - 43.21C.910 (1996).
221. Noel v. Cole, Mem. Op. No. 9806, (Island County Super. Ct, Wash., June 23, 1978), and
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decision, in early 1979, by withdrawing all timber sales and developing a
complex forest planning process. The planning process included the Forest
Land Management Program, which yielded the first Forest Land Manage-
ment Plan, accompanied by a programmatic environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) as required by SEPA. In October 1979, environmentalists filed
suit claiming that the EIS was inadequate.' The DNR responded by de-
signing a process to produce a series of planning documents, reports, and
revised documents that are familiar to students of federal land manage-
ment planning. The evolution of the state process is summarized in
Table 1.2 It is important to note that this planning process is not re-
quired by statute. Rather, the trustee developed the planning regime as a
prudent response to stop public outcry.
1979 Forest Land Management Program (& Final EIS).
1982 1983-1992 Forest Land Management Program (FLMP).
1983 Proposed Forest Land Management Program, 1984-1993.
1984 Final Forest Land Management Program, 1984-1993 (& Final EIS)
1987 State Forest Board Lands: A Report to the Counties.
1989 Commission on Old Growth Alternatives for Washington's Forested
Trust Lands Final Report.
1992 Final Forest Resource Policy Plan, 1992-2002 (& Final EIS).
1996 Habitat Conservation Plan (& Final EIS).
Table 1. Washingon DNR Timber Planning Policy Documents. 4
Harvesting on the Loomis became an issue just as the long-delayed
sales program was taking shape. The Loomis Forest is the largest of the
DNR's trust land units, consisting of 134,000 acres in North Central
Washington. Although it constitutes about five percent of the 2.1 million
acres managed by the DNR, it is also among the least valuable trust prop-
erties. Until the early 1990s, the lodgepole pine, which dominates the site
Order Granting Summ. J. (January 3, 1979).
222. The litigation was known as 2.1 Million Acres of Trees v. Cole, (Thurston County Sup. Ct.
1979) (No. 79-2-01135-2). This case never went to trial because the DNR reached a settlement agree-
ment (on file with the authors) with the plaintiffs. The provisions in this agreement were subsequently
incorporated in the 1983 Forest Land Management Plan. Telephone conversation with Mr. Jerry Otto,
Director of Policy, DNR, April 17, 1997.
223. This evolution is discussed in great detail in Souder, et al., supra note 38, passim.
224. Source: Souder et al., supra note 38.
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and the dispute, was considered to have little or no commercial value. In
1992 and 1993, the value of the timber increased, and the DNR began
offering sales. The sales were immediately challenged by both environ-
mental groups and the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife. In
late 1992, former DNR Commissioner Bryan Boyle withdrew the remain-
ing sales.' The issue then became a salvage sale problem when the
Loomis experienced the outbreak of pine beetles. The new DNR Commis-
sioner Jennifer Belcher responded with yet another planning process. This
time, a citizens group reviewed the resources of the Loomis and recom-
mended goals and objectives for managing the forest. This citizen's review
provided a framework for a draft Loomis State Forest Landscape Plan and
accompanying EIS, which were published in March, 1994. The final plan
was published in June, 1996, about a week after the district court rendered
its first opinion in the Okanogan County case.2"s
2. The Challenge
In Okanogan County, the plaintiffs argued that the DNR's self-de-
signed planning process was a tactic demonstrating "that the DNR has
chosen to favor the interests of its environmental constituents over its
legally mandated trust responsibilities." 7 Specifically, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the trustee was avoiding harvest in order to protect endangered
species, notably the lynx. This, plaintiffs asserted, was a violation of their
duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiary. The plaintiffs sought three
remedies. First, they requested a writ of mandamus ordering DNR to com-
ply with a state law that directs them to "determine if the sale of the dam-
aged timber is in the best interests of the trust for which the land is held."
State law requires DNR to make the determination within seven months
from when DNR identified the damage. Plaintiffs charged that such de-
termination was being arbitrarily and capriciously withheld.' Second,
"because the Respondents have proven themselves incapable of acting as
prudent trust managers," the plaintiffs asked the court to "require the DNR
to undertake a commercially reasonable and prudent program of harvest
and salvage." Specifically, the plaintiffs presented an alternative plan for
managing the Loomis which they requested the court to enjoin the DNR to
adopt. Finally, the plaintiffs requested the court to retain jurisdiction of the
225. Declaration of Roy Henderson, DNR, at 4, Okanogan County.
226. See WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Natural Resources Board
Adopts Long-Term Plan for Managing Loomis State Forest (Press Release), June 4, 1996.
227. Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Request for Mandatory and Injunctive Relief at 24,
Okanogan County. Petitioners asked for an injunction and a writ of mandamus. Id. at 33-34. This dis-
cussion focuses not on the legal requirements defining those forms of relief in Washington, which
were obviously much debated, but on the trustee's duty of prudent management of the trust.
228. Id. at 8-9.
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case and consider damages resulting from DNR's failure to act in a timely
manner. 9
The plaintiffs' core argument is a difficult one to sustain technically.
The plaintiffs asserted that there is an unvarying process of natural suc-
cession at work on the Loomis State Forest when the trees, primarily
lodgepole pine, reach maturity, they become vulnerable to insect infesta-
tion. Infected trees, if not harvested, will inevitably bum, making way for
a new forest and a repetition of the cycle. Plaintiffs also contended that
there is only one prudent way to respond to this inevitable chain of events:
the "only way out," their brief asserts repeatedly, is to harvest as much
lodgepole as possible before it is killed, and then to accelerate the harvest
of dead and dying timber before "a fire explodes which no amount of
human intervention can control."'
The heart of their argument is that ecosystem processes are absolutely
predictable and managing them is a no-brainer. The trustee has no option
but to, harvest, to maximize returns for the beneficiary rather than let as-
sets die and bum. One petitioner argued that "if long-term maximization
of timber revenues consistent with the general laws results in the total
destruction of lynx habitat in the Loomis Forest, then the lynx must go.
They are not trust beneficiaries."'
The DNR responded with a discourse on prudence. In response to the
plaintiffs' assertion that managing the Loomis presents no option but to
harvest in response to the unvarying cycle from pest crisis to catastrophic
fire, the agency described the complex biological, economic and political
factors surrounding the forest. The DNR asserted that prudence was re-
quired first and foremost in the face of biological complexity and uncer-
tainty. The trustee obviously did not argue that it had an obligation to the
lynx or to achieve any other biodiversity goal. It did, however, tie overall
health of the-forest ecosystem to long-term trust productivity.22 Accord-
229. Id. at 3, 34.
230. Id. at 6, 20-21.
231. Trial Brief of the Timber Counties at 10, Okanogan County.
232. State Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Request for Mandamus Writ at 23, Okanogan
County (citing the FOREST RESOURCE PLAN (FRP), Appendix A at 12-19); see also Declaration of
James A. Steams, Assistant Manager for the Community and Landowner Assistance Section, Resource
Protection Division, Washington State DNR, at 12. This conclusion is supported by a recent Wash-
ington Attorney General's Opinion on the precise subject: "Though providing economic support to the
beneficiaries remains the primary purpose of the Department's responsibilities with regard to the feder-
al grant lands, this purpose does not exclude all other considerations so long as such considerations are
consistent with protecting the economic value and productivity of the federal grant land trusts. 1996
Op. Att'y Gen. 11, at 49. The opinion also cites with approval the recent findings of the Utah Su-
preme Court:
To the extent that preservation of non-economic values does not constitute a diversion of
trust assets or resources, such an activity may be prudently undertaken. To the extent...
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ing to the state's assessment of risk and benefit, it is not necessary for the
lynx to be a beneficiary. Protecting the lynx is prudent for two reasons.
First, the trustee would be imprudent to foreclose the possibility that the
lynx would some day become a marketable and valuable trust resource.
Second, in the face of real ambiguities about the effects of intervening by
harvest on forest ecosystems, maintaining the forest ecosystem is neces-
sary to maintaining the long-term productivity of the timber resource. 3
The second element of the DNR's arguments concerning prudence
centered on economic factors. As the Loomis State Forest "contains much
of the least productive trust forest land in the state in terms of timber
growth potential and return on investments," one high DNR official point-
ed out, "the Loomis Forest historically has not been a high priority for
investment of limited trust management funds... opportunity costs must
be considered. Funds invested for low return or net-cost salvage operations
in the Loomis are funds that cannot be invested elsewhere for perhaps
greater returns." 4
Third, the DNR discussed its planning process in terms of "political
prudence." DNR argued that it was prudent to proceed in a way that al-
lowed it to continue to operate, citing opposition to harvest as a factor that
was "greatly hampering the DNR's ability to manage the forest for the
benefit of the trust with any predictability or degree of success." 5 The
DNR noted the need for careful planning, and trust building among inter-
ested parties, arguing that the planning process that it had developed,
almost totally without statutory direction or parameters, was in the best
interests of the trust.'
Finally, the trustee emphasized the long-term nature of its manage-
ment responsibilities. Long-term productivity is a central element in trust
that the protection of non-economic values is necessary for maximizing the economic value
of the property, such protection may be prudently undertaken. When such preservation or
protection results in a diversion of assets or loss of economic opportunity, a breach of duty
is indicated.
Id. at 48 (citing National Parks & Conservation Ass'n. v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 916
(Utah 1993)).
233. For example, conifer boughs sales, pole sales, mushroom harvesting leases, and small diam-
eter timber sales serve as examples of current revenue sources which did not appear feasible in the
past. DNR previously recognized the value of native genetic material and set aside 2,417 acres of gene
pool reserves to ensure that native genetic material, well adapted to local conditions, will be available
to the trusts in the future. DNR attempts to maintain the production capacity of trust assets. State
Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 29, Okanogan County (citing FRP, supra note 232, App. A at 18-
19).
234. Steams Declaration, supra note 234, at 3, 11; see also Declaration of Wes Culp, Regional
Manager for the Northeast Region, DNR at 2-3, Okanogan County.
235. Culp Declaration, supra note 234, at 2.
236. Declaration of Charles I. Johnson, Highlands District Manager, Northeastern Region, DNR
at 4, Okanogan County.
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land management because of the school trust's close relationship to the
permanent school fund-both the lands and the funds which land manage-
ment produces are a part of the trust which must be managed in perpetu-
ity.27 This commitment to perpetuity justifies extremely conservative
management: there are no effective ways to predict the future-biological,
economic or social-nor is there anything like a clear understanding of
what the long-term consequences of intense harvesting or alteration of
forest systems might be. Therefore, the trustee's efforts to protect and
maintain a functioning forest ecosystem system in light of the long-term
commitments of the-trust is prudent. 5
The issue of political prudence raises the question of how far a trust-
ee can go in over-complying with environmental standards and require-
ments. Are they limited to merely meeting the minimum standard, or can
they over-comply, doing more than is required to protect watersheds,
endangered species, or cultural resources? Can they hold off, or withdraw
sales, as Commissioners Belcher and Boyle both did, in an effort to fore-
stall criticism and more draconian regulation, even if it reduces returns to
the beneficiary, either in the short term or over time? DNR argued that it
was prudent in some cases to exceed minimum standards, even though it
imposed short-term costs on the trust. Finally, DNR asserted that it may
undertake some actions that do not produce profit for the trust simply to
maintain working relations in the community: "Strong emphasis was put
on involvement of other state agencies and interested parties in order to
develop a level of trust that would allow timber sale operations to success-
fully advance to more appropriate levels." ' 9
3. The Decision
As noted in Section H of this article, three of the five issues that
shape judicial review under APA standards--the issue of standing, the
issue of what law to apply, and the issue of whether the trustee is pursuing
an old or a new policy initiative-simply do not come up in discussions of
a trustee's discretion. However, the other two issues-the shape of the
trustee's expertise and how it figures into the review, and the option of
withholding action-are both interesting and generally found in trustee
237. See STATE TRUsT LANDs, supra note 4, at 3, 69, 242-44, 278-98.
238. "The biology of forest ecosystems is not a perfect science," asserted declarant Steams.
"There are potential risks to the trusts in being more aggressive in the harvesting of timber to maxi-
mize value. There are potential risks to the trusts in being more protective of wildlife habitat and other
public resources. The anticipated Loomis Plan is intended to strike a balance of risks at this point in
time while creating and maintaining flexibility as more reliable biological information is available in
the future." Steams Declaration, supra note 232, at 9-10.
239. Culp Declaration, supra note 234, at 4.
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decision review and in the present case.
As to the plaintiffs' gross assertions about managing the forest-that
is regarding the basic issue of the need for any exercise of prudence, the
court was quite clear. The court unequivocally rejected the plaintiffs'
assertion that managing the Loomis is a no-brainer. Quotes around the
term managing suggesting what DNR had argued, the court concluded that
"[a]fter reviewing all of the technical reports ... , it is apparent to the
Court that 'managing' a forest of this size and diversity is a very complex
and vast undertaking."'  On another familiar but relevant threshold is-
sue, the court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the trustee's primary
goal is to maximize current return for the beneficiaries. While noting that
the "State is prohibited from actions with regard to trust assets that pro-
vide benefits to others at the expense of trust beneficiaries," the court
stated that "[tihere is nothing in the law that requires the Department to
maximize current income.""24 The court emphasized the same long-term
commitments as did DNR, noting that the trustees obligations were to all
beneficiaries, "current and future, though the needs and desires of present
beneficiaries m[a]y [sic] conflict with the needs and desires of future
beneficiaries." '242 Although the court held over for trial a final decision
on whether the trustee was "placing environmental interests above those
interests of the beneficiaries,"243 the court also concluded that "the De-
partment must conserve and enhance natural resources in State forest trust
lands to attain the highest long-term net income from these lands. In exer-
cising its duties, the Department, as trust manager, must act in a manner
that is equitable to all generations, including acting reasonably to avoid
foreclosing future options of generating income from the trust assets for
future generations."'
The trustee's expertise has a significantly different texture in the
court's discussions than the Forest Service's expertise in Idaho Conserva-
tion League. The Okanogan County court ignored the normal trust law
formulation regarding escalating expectations for ostensibly expert trust-
ees.24 Instead, the court stated that the "Department is bound to display
the skill and prudence which an ordinarily capable and careful person
would use in the conduct of managing a trust of like character with similar
objectives."2" That having been said, neither the trustees' expertise nor
court deference to it is ever mentioned in the decision.
240. Mem. Decision, supra note 215, at 7.
241. Id. at 8.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 13.
244. Id. at 9.
245. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
246. Id.
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The court is clear that the plaintiffs "do not need to prove that the
Department acted arbitrarily or capriciously."'247 The court noted, in an
interesting twist on the APA's formulation of a familiar phrase, that "the
Court may not permit the beneficiaries of the trust to substitute their judg-
ment for that of the trustee's judgment. However," the court continued,
"the beneficiaries are entitled to a trustee that does not abuse its discretion
in the exercise of its duties."2  An abuse of discretion was not defined
in terms of the amount of data presented, how it is weighed, or in the
presence or absence of disagreement among experts. Rather, an abuse of
discretion was defined simply as a breach of the duties that the trustee
owes to the trust beneficiaries. 9 Thus, the court is not required to find
either the agency or the plaintiff "more" right on the facts; nor is the court
required to decide whether or not its agrees with the agency's decision,
even though it finds others more persuasive. And the trustee is not re-
quired to fake or simulate certainty as to its choice among the considered
options when almost any observer can see that there are real ambiguities.
The criterion is not the perfection of the data but the credibility of the
assertion that the decision was made with the long- and short-term benefits
to the beneficiaries clearly in mind. This would seem to put the burden of
proof on the trustee to show that it was acting prudently. This is, as we
have noted elsewhere, where the burden lies in most cases of this type.'
This advantage to the complainant was somewhat mitigated in this
particular dispute by the remedy which they sought. Indeed, the discussion
of prudence most closely resembles the APA-type assessment of the
agency's expertise when the court assesses whether the plaintiff has made
an adequate showing that a clear legal or equitable right is about to be
invaded in a way that causes real and substantial injury to the plaintiff.
This they must do in order to meet the state standards for a preliminary
injunction."' Thus, the proof requirements for the remedy sought by
plaintiffs put an interesting torque on the burden of proof. This appears to
have shifted the outcome in favor of the trustee.
The court noted that the plaintiffs' assertions (about the trustee's dis-
cretion and lack of loyalty to the beneficiary) contained two major errors.
First, in devising the alternative management plan which plaintiffs urged
the court to impose on DNR, plaintiffs' consultant had proceeded, incor-
rectly, as if the trustee were not required to comply with SEPA's envi-
247. Id. at 10.
248. Id.
249. ... . the Court cannot find that the Department clearly breached the duties it owes to the
trust beneficiaries, i.e., abused its discretion." Id.
250. See STATE TRUST LANDS, supra note 4, at 277-78.
251. Mem. Decision, supra note 215, at 10.
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ronmental assessment requirements.5 2 Second, the same consultant had
failed to provide an analysis of the damages which his clients would suf-
fer:
Without an economic analysis having been completed by Mr. Ebel, it is
impossible for the Court to determine whether or not the failure to har-
vest in the area... will result in actual and substantial injury to any of
the beneficiaries, even those not named as plaintiffs. Consequently, the
Petitioners have failed to prove that the actions or inaction of the Depart-
ment.., will result in actual and substantial injury ....
While this case casts new light on our previous suggestions about burden
of proof advantages to the plaintiff in trust cases, the plaintiffs here proba-
bly lost their advantage because of these errors. The burden of proof ad-
vantage presumably still exists, even in instances where plaintiffs seek an
injunction.
Despite their errors, the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on the manda-
mus issue. State law requires that once the DNR has identified that timber
has been damaged by fire, wind, flood or any other cause, DNR has seven
months to "determine if the sale of the damaged timber is in the best
interests of the trust for which the land is held." 4 The DNR must, the
court concluded, decide whether or not to harvest timber. The court de-
clined to suggest what the decision should be or to identify an appropriate
timeframe for the decision.5 It was, curiously, inclined to hold hearings
on what the timeframe should be. Given the delay already created by the
planning process, the court suggested "a short time period to be appropri-
ate. ' ' 2s
6
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Okanogan County court's discussion of the trustee's discretion in
timber salvage sales differs significantly both from what we encountered
in judicial review of federal land managers' decisions, and, to a lesser
extent, from what we expected review of trustees's decisions to be. Many
of the observed distinctions arise from the quite different origins of the
administrative regime. Although the status of the state trust lands as public
property masks some of the contextual differences, the traditions of trust
law are essentially private. The courts act to protect the beneficiary from a
wayward trustee in an arena defined by a contract-like instrument. In
252. Id. at 7. The plaintiffs' attorneys did not, however, miss the point. See Memorandum in
Support of Petitioners' Request for Mandatory and Injunctive Relief at 33-34, Okanagan County.
253. Mem. Decision, supra note 215, at 13.
254. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.795 (1996).
255. Mem. Decision, supra note 215, at 9-10.
256. Id. at 10.
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contrast, when reviewing public administrators, the courts' own role is
defined in relationship to the foundation architecture of the separation of
powers. Some of these basic distinctions appear to have been trumped by
the subject matter-irrespective of whether public forests are managed by
a federal bureaucrat or a state trustee, they are public lands, and a set of
procedural expectations that has evolved over the last thirty years defines
not only what is legally required of the administrator, but also what is
politically prudent for the trustee. It is not surprising that both trustees and
administrators produce piles of planning documents and engage in intense
and extensive public dialogue regarding the management of public lands.
It is significant, however, that the courts look as these quite similar assem-
blages in different ways.
We argued at the outset that it is easier for plaintiffs challenging
trustees to gain access to court than it is for those challenging administra-
tors. This was in part based on the idea that the issue of what "law to
apply" does not come up on trust lands as it does on the federal public
lands. This difference is readily observable in the salvage cases reviewed.
Courts do not find themselves unable to review actions that have been
"committed by law" to trustee discretion. However, our argument that
standing is less important as a prerequisite for challenging a trustee than
for challenging an administrator looks better in the abstract than in the
case studies. Although the theoretical distinctions did not affect the cases
under review, we believe that this issue bears continuing scrutiny.
The second major distinction which we anticipated was in the record
amassed and the court's use of it. The APA, we argued, requires the ad-
ministrator to compile a record to support her decision, to defend the
choice of one option as against others proposed and analyzed. This re-
quires, we asserted further, administrators to evince a certainty which they
do not always feel, and which is not justifiable on the record. This is
significantly different from the trustee's obligation to prudently weigh the
risks and benefits of a proposed action and to exercise judgment. If this
suggested that the state trustee was immune from the data wars and piles
of documents that surround federal administrators, we have demonstrated
the contrary. Perhaps because public expectations have been defined by
the elaborate planning and public involvement process on federal lands,
trustees in Washington found it prudent to engage in a lengthy planning
and public comment program not unlike the federal efforts. Because the
state process is defined by the trustee rather than by statute, the state trust-
ee appears less vulnerable than the federal administrator to merely proce-
dural claims-who signed this document or that one, or should have?
Being a trustee does not, we may conclude, indemnify the state from
meeting public expectations as well as professional criteria for adequate
planning, circulation and discussion of relevant documents. The difference
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here-and it is crucial-is that the trustee does not have to pretend to be
sure. The trustee is supposed to identify risks and make choices. The
emphasis on analyzing risks and benefits, as compared to defending as
scientifically correct one of many options, emerges as significant in these
cases.
Third, we hypothesized that a difference in a court's response to an
assertion of expertise is significant. Under the APA, courts are required to
defer to administrative expertise, in part because of their own limited
technical expertise and in part because of the separation of powers. In
contrast, we expected that when a trustee asserts a high level of expertise,
reviewing courts would respond by requiring a higher level of perfor-
mance. This would, we argued, have important ramifications for the bur-
den of proof. In administrative law we saw a presumption that the agency
knows what it is doing, thus requiring the challenger to demonstrate the
contrary. In trust law, the trustee is required to demonstrate that she is
acting prudently. This distinction also emerged as important in our case
studies. The courts deferred almost absolutely to Forest Service expertise,
in spite of very clear evidence that other agencies, with considerable rele-
vant expertise, disagreed uniformly with the Forest Service's judgment.
Even when the contest is constructed, not as a choice between court and
agency expertise, but between the unanimous opinion of multiple relevant
agencies and one responsible agency, the responsible agency has a prefer-
ence.
In the trust case, expertise did not play out precisely as the hornbooks
would suggest. The court ignored the utterly routine guideline that those
alleging expertise will be held to a higher standard than an ordinarily
prudent person; it at least nominally evaluated DNR decisions against a
ordinary prudence standard. This occurred largely without discussion, most
likely because of the specific factual situation confronting the court. Be-
cause the plaintiffs had made such an extreme argument-that no pru-
dence was required to manage inevitable ecological cycles-the court was
merely required to notice that ecosystem management is complex rather
than hold the DNR to any particular standard of care. The situation was
further confused by the remedy sought-standards for gaining an injunc-
tion appear to have pushed the court's analysis in the direction of an
APA-like apportioning of the burden of proof.
Fourth, we explored whether the agent may be censured for not tak-
ing action. This was squarely at issue in the Loomis case, and the agency
was in fact ordered by the court to make judgments about the advisability
of a harvest of damaged timber. This was, however, in response to a spe-
cific statutory directive that the trustee do so within a specified period
after determining that stands within the Forest contained dead trees. But
the DNR in this instance decided to delay a full-scale salvage program (at
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least in the eyes of the plaintiffs) until such time as they determined
through their landscape-level analysis that it would be in the best long-
term interest of the trust. So the court determined that their taking no
immediate action was clearly within deference owed to the DNR in its
trustee capacity.
In the contrasting Federal example from the Thunderbolt salvage sale,
the Forest Service defendants felt that they were required to expeditiously
act to capture the value of the timber before it deteriorated. They charac-
terized requests for additional analysis from their previously collaborating
agencies, and the plaintiffs, as "paralysis through analysis." But as Heckler
illustrates,' they would have been equally within the deference given
them by Congress to decide not to harvest timber as to decide that har-
vesting was desirable.
Finally-and related to deference to agency expertise-if an agency
has embarked on a policy or strategy, is it required to continue it? It is
worth noting that the Washington DNR, having announced that it would
undertake a landscape-scale plan for the Loomis State Forest, believed that
it was required to do so. We cannot, based on the present analyses, speak
to the issue of whether a trustee would be forced to proceed with a previ-
ously announced course of action if it concluded that it was not prudent to
do so. However, it seems so unlikely as to be irrelevant. In a different
factual context, the Forest Service contended that "changed circumstances"
resulting from catastrophic fires allowed it to abrogate previous policies
and inter-agency agreements. The Forest Service stated in the Boise Na-
tional Forest Plan "Standards for the South Fork Salmon River Drainage"
that it would consider the recommendations of the host of other public
agencies and incorporate their consensus recommendations prior to imple-
menting any timber sales or land-disturbing activities.l 8 It even justified
this strategy in the face of adverse public comments in the Plan's Environ-
mental Impact Statement:
The Boise and Payette National Forests have worked cooperatively, and
used extensive public participation to arrive at the language for manage-
ment of the South Fork Salmon River drainage found in Chapter IV of
the Forest Plan, which will demonstrate restoration of the South Fork.
We want to acknowledge the dedication of, and thank those agencies,
Indian tribal, timber industry, .and environmental representatives, and
those interested individuals who gave many hours of their time to help
with this effort." 9
257. Supra notes 54-55, 67-68 and accompanying text.
258. See USDA FOREST SERviCE, BOISE NATIONAL FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT PLAN, IV, at 76-77 (1990).
259. USDA FOREST SERVICE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, BOISE NATIONAL
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That the Forest Service could then assert that it had the sole expertise to
determine whether the salvage sales could go forward-and have the
courts defer to its expertise-points to the fundamental difference in the
burden of proof required of trustees under the trust doctrine and adminis-
trators under the APA, when the manager asserts expertise.
We use these conclusions regarding judicial review of management
decisions to make one further suggestion concerning the impact of differ-
ences in judicial review criteria for trust land and federal agency land
management. This is a background notion concerning the role of the legis-
lature. As we have argued elsewhere,' one of the key elements of the
trust mandate is that it is clear, unqualified, and therefore relatively simple
to interpret. And because it is the product of an intersection between an-
cient common law notions of the trust and grants and commitments made
largely, but not exclusively, in state constitutions during the accession
process, it is relatively immune from episodic legislative redefinition. For
good or for ill, depending on one's policy preferences and what the trustee
is doing at any point, trust land management is on a clearly marked path
which is familiar to the courts. No agency flim-flamming about the exotic
repositories of expertise in ecosystem management will divert the court
from its essential role of assuring undivided loyalty to the beneficiary. We
see real differences in how the federal and state managers approached the
salvage sale issue and how the courts responded to their decisions. How-
ever, a primary ingredient is that the legislature has a different role,which
inserts greater stability into the trustee's decision-making environment."s
These are subtle differences, not night and day. No one who has
looked at the reams of documents that the trustee produced in the course
of its planning for Washington State Forests in general and the Loomis in
particular would argue that the trust mandate puts administration of the
state's granted lands on a wholly different administrative footing than
federal public lands. However, as the high water mark on the "hard look"
doctrine and easy standing for plaintiffs recedes, we anticipate that these
distinctions will become sharper and more important in the future.
FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN, VI-53 (1990).
260. See generally Souder et al., supra note 4.
261. See County of Skamania v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984) (where the court
struck down as violative of the state's duty as trustee, a law which allowed timber contractors to de-
fault on or modify their timber contracts when falling timber prices made the contracts financially
difficult to fulfill).
